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Theory of Mind Tasks reflect a common underlying process? Evidence from individual 
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consideration at publication at Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, submitted as an original 
article.
Despite the vast literature on theory of mind (the ability to understand other agents have 
different beliefs, desires and knowledge to oneself), the nature and origin of interference 
effects seen between the ‘self’ and ‘other’ perspectives in ToM tasks have not been examined 
in terms of individual differences. The current study addresses two fundamental questions 
within the theory of mind literature: are there systematic individual differences in self-other 
interference, and are these differences due to individual differences in executive function? 
The study comprised a large-scale path analysis model examining the relationship between 
performance on inhibitory control and two theory of mind tasks that involve dealing with 
interference between self and other perspectives. Results suggest that self/other interference 
effects in the two ToM tasks were dissociable, and related to different tests of inhibitory 
control. We conclude that while self/other interference is a key part of ToM tasks, it may not 
be the only limiting step for healthy adults’ performance on typical tasks.
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We hope we have addressed the concerns of both yourself and the reviewers with our revised 
submission. We detail our responses to all comments below, and thank you for the detailed, 
informative and useful points and suggestions made.
Editor comments
“your 'theory of mind' tasks may not actually require representing others’ mental states. If this 
is the case, your data may not allow us to draw conclusions about ToM in general, but just 
about these two tasks; and an alternative interpretation of your data would be that these two 
tasks are themselves measuring domain-general inhibition and not ToM. I'd like to see a 
robust rebuttal of this interpretation.”
***We have added a substantial new section to the discussion to address this concern.
 
Please expand on the implications of the finding that the general inhibition tasks don’t 
correlate particularly highly with each other; The reliability was poor for ‘ambiguous errors’ 
in the director task – please discuss this in your comments on reliability in the final sections 
of the manuscript; Please include a statement regarding ethical approval.
***Thanks for highlighting these. We have added a line re. low reliabilities to the Limitations 
in ToM measures section: we note that while task reliabilities were generally high (< .7) 
the reliability for ambiguous errors in the Director task was .59. The low correlations 
between the inhibitory control tasks are common in the literature (e.g. Friedman & Miyake, 
2004), potentially due to task impurity issues.  We have added a line to reflect this to the Data 
screening section. We have also added a line to the participants section regarding ethical 
approval: Ethical approval was gained from the departmental ethics committee.
Reviewer Comments to Author (if any):
Reviewer: 1
Comments to the Author
This paper involves two assessments of Theory of Mind abilities – visual perspective taking 
Level 1 and a referential communication task, the ‘Director’ task – along with four different 
measures of inhibitory control, aiming to establish (1) whether self/other interference effects 
are seen to the same extent across different tasks, (2) how inhibition predicts ToM task 
performance, and (3) whether the inhibition and ToM relationship varies across tasks. The 
study utilized a good sample size of 142 participants, and used path analysis to examine 
relationships between outcomes. Results showed a dissociable self/other interference effect 
across the two ToM measures; further, path analysis showed that each of the ToM task 
interference effects were predicted by different inhibitory control tasks. The authors conclude 
that self/other interference is not a unitary construct, varying across different task demands.
This paper is well-written and thorough, and was enjoyable to read, addressing a key research 
area in ToM literature (individual differences in ToM and executive control). The study 
involved a large subject number, and used a number of different tasks to assess both ToM and 
EF, allowing subtle differences between tasks and relationships across tasks to be assessed. I 
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have some minor clarification points as detailed below, but overall was impressed with the 
study.
Introduction:
Page 4, line 50-53: The authors review here prior literature that has suggested training 
participants to inhibit automatic imitation led to improved performance on a test of ToM, 
whereas generic inhibition training did not. This could do with a bit more explanation to 
make the prior findings clearer, including why decreased imitation would lead to ToM 
improvement and how this relates to the current study. 
***We have added lines (in bold) to clarify why this effect may have occurred:  
“Santiesteban, White, Cook, Gilbert, Heyes and Bird (2012) found that training participants 
to inhibit automatic imitation improved performance on a test that required participants to use 
their ToM (the Director Task; Keysar, Lin & Barr, 2003), whereas training generic inhibition 
did not, suggesting that inhibition of automatic imitation and ToM rely on control over 
representations related to self and other, and these control processes are not the same as 
those involved in conventional “inhibition” tasks.”.
With regard to the relationship to the current study, we go on to state that such findings 
(along with neuroscience findings, e.g. Bardi, Six & Brass, 2017; Wagner, Maril, Bjork & 
Schacter, 2001) suggest that self-other control is a more domain-specific process as “generic 
inhibition training did not improve ToM performance; though see a recent meta-
analysis by Darda and Ramsey (2019))”, and that this leads to our “prediction that there 
will be individual differencves in self-other control across different ToM tasks, and that these 
should not be related to individual differences in executive function.”.
Page 4, line 29-33: this is a personal preference, but I would avoid starting a sentence with 
the word ‘and’ – this makes the paragraph a bit jumpy. 
***So edited – thanks for spotting this.
Appendix A (Individual Task Results):
Shape-Matching Task (and others): the authors state that ‘Response time values that were 
more than three standard deviations away from the condition mean for a participant were 
replaced by the cut-off value (of three standard deviations from the condition mean)’. Could 
the authors please comment on why this approach was taken? It is not clear why these values 
were not removed as outliers, rather than replaced. Additionally, please include information 
about how many data points were required to be changed/how many exceeded this cut off.  
***We didn’t remove the outliers as we followed the recommended data screening procedure 
of Friedman and Miyake (2004) and Oberauer (2005) in order to retain as many data points as 
possible, and also to reduce the effect of any extreme response times on the mean.
For those measures that used error rates (Go / No-Go (picture) and Go / No-Go tasks), no 
outliers were removed or replaced. For the Shape-matching task 1.41% of trials were 
replaced. For the Stop-Signal task, no initial data points were removed or replaced, but two 
participant SSRT values were replaced as per Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) due to an 
Page 3 of 89 Psychonomic Bulletin & Review submission
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
extremely non-normal distribution. For the L1-VPT task, only matching trials were analysed. 
Of these 1.41% were incorrect responses, 2.04% had response times more than 2.5 SDs from 
the mean, and 0.47% were response omissions, totalling 3.92%. The Director Task replaced 
0.48% of trials.
Lines covering the above have been added to section A3 of the new Appendix A (executive 
task details).
A minor point, but why for inhibitory control tasks were responses removed if over 3 
standard deviations from the mean, but for the L1 VPT task 2.5 standard deviations was used 
as criteria?
***We followed the procedures most commonly employed in the published literature for the 
L1 VPT task (Qureshi et al., 2010) and for the various inhibitory control tasks, and have 
added a footnote to reflect this.
Discussion:
Page 21 – Lines 18-36: This paragraph needs to be more fully explained/contain further 
information to make argument clearer. 
***We have edited this paragraph to improve the clarity of the argument, we hope that this is 
now clearer.
Reviewer: 2
Comments to the Author
The paper investigates individual differences in Theory of Mind performance and the 
relationship between self-other interference and inhibitory control. The research question is 
relevant and the manuscript has certainly the potential to provide an important contribution to 
the literature of the field. However, I list below some issues/questions that should be 
addressed to improve the quality of the manuscript.
1. A number of “executive control” tasks have been included in the study (some of which 
are not reported in the manuscript). I assume the authors meant to measure different 
aspects of inhibitory control but I have the impression that the theoretical motivation 
behind task selection is missing.
 It is also not clear what were the specific predictions with respect to correlations with 
individual tasks. In effect, results show that the two perspective taking tasks correlate 
with different measures of executive control (i.e., different tasks). The interpretation of 
this outcome seems to be challenging, but I think the authors should try to elaborate a bit 
more on that.
***We have added a short section on executive task selection on p9 of the main manuscript 
and in Appendix A included a more extensive discussion of the rationale for task selection, 
analysis, and predictions for relationships among tasks.
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2. The sample size has been selected without an appropriate power analysis. A power 
analysis should be performed to determine the optimal sample for the study.
***This was an omission on our part, thank you for pointing it out. At the time of data 
collection, the rule of thumb sample size (Kline, 2005) was used which suggests a 10:1 ratio 
for free parameters as a realistic figure. This gives sample sizes of 180 for the initial model, 
60 for the second model and 80 for the final model. He also suggests that a sample size of 
between 100 – 200 can be considered a medium sample size. 
Preacher and Coffman (2006) provide a sample size and power analysis calculator based on 
RMSEA values. Taking α as .05, df = 20 (final model), and n = 142, and setting the null 
RMSE value as .08 (cut-off for a poor fitting model; Kenny, 2015) and the alternative 
RMSEA value as .00 (final model), this gives us a power of .67 to detect whether this is a 
poor fitting model.
The same calculator suggests with null RMSEA = .01 (excellent fit), alternative RMSEA as 
.08 (mediocre fit) and an observed power of .8, the sample size should be 169. Therefore we 
believe that considering the experimental nature of the study, the sample size is sufficient for 
the model, which is supported by the bootstrapping estimates. Indeed, changing the mediocre 
fit cut-off RMSEA value to .10 (as per Kline, 2005) changes the observed power to .92, and 
the recommended sample size to 107.
We have added the following after Table 4:
A power analysis was conducted on the final model fit values and sample size using 
Preacher and Coffman’s (2006) power and sample size calculator for RMSEA. This 
suggests that the current sample size has a power of .92 to detect whether this was a 
poor fitting model1. Testing whether the sample size was sufficient for the final model 
showed that an ideal sample size should be 107 (with .10 as the RMSEA value for a poor 
fit; Kenny, 20142). Kline (2005) suggests a 10:1 ratio for free parameters as a realistic 
figure, which gives an estimated sample size of 80 for the final model. The current 
sample size is appropriate for the current analyses.
Preacher, K. J., & Coffman, D. L. (2006, May). Computing power and minimum sample size 
for RMSEA [Computer software]. Available from http://quantpsy.org/.
Kenny, D. A. (2014, January 12). Structural Equation Modelling. Retrieved June 11, 2019, 
from http://davidakenny.net/cm/causalm.htm
3. It is not clear to me why the two perspective-taking tasks where chosen over other 
measures of self-other control. Moreover, aren’t those two tasks typically considered to 
measure perspective taking, and not ToM tasks?
***We thank the reviewer for encouraging us to make our reasoning apparent here, but 
respectfully disagree with the suggestion that visual perspective-taking is distinct from ToM. 
1 Observed power = .8, df = 20, n =142, null RMSEA = .01 (excellent fit), alternative RMSEA = .00 (final 
model value).
2 Observed power = .8, df = 20, null RMSEA = .01, alternative RMSEA = .10
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In support of our position, we note that visual perspective-taking is widely seen as a 
component of the development of ToM in children, and features in much contemporary 
discussion of the cognitive basis of ToM in adults. Our choice of these tasks was further 
influenced by the fact that they are relatively unusual in having been analysed into 
component processes to which inhibitory control may make distinctive contributions. This 
contrasts with the majority of ToM “measures” which are often quite opaque with respect to 
their underlying functional processes. On p10 we now include a paragraph explaining this 
rationale.
4. Two different versions of a go/no-go task were included. How the distinction between 
letter and image-based task would be relevant to the goal of the study?
***The Go / No-Go (picture) based task required an additional step of processing (the 
identification of the image as being a bird or mammal), followed by the response 
inhibition/selection required to choose whether to respond or not, based on the phonological 
or orthographical information (did the name begin with a vowel or consonant). This 
represented another variation of task that requires inhibition, which also required an 
additional step of response selection, resulting in more individual variability in inhibition 
being captured. We have detailed this in section A2 of Appendix A (executive task details).
5. The interference effect for the shape-matching task was calculated by using only two 
of the four task conditions: the no-match distractor and the match no-distractor condition. 
This choice seems arbitrary to me (and I find the explanation provided in the appendix not 
completely convincing). I think the authors should rather consider the difference between the 
two distractor present conditions and the two distractor absent conditions (distractor present 
match + distractor present no-match)/2 – (distractor absent match + distractor absent no-
match)/2. 
***Again, thank you for this suggestion. We agree, and have reanalysed the data accordingly 
with the suggested difference scores. The resulting model shows the same relationships with 
the ToM tasks, but no correlation between the shape-matching and stop-signal tasks.
6. About the shape-matching task, it was reported in the appendix: “there was an 
interaction between distraction and matching as can be noted in Figure A3”. However, 
perhaps because the scale of the figure, it is not clear what the interaction entails. Please 
adapt the graph accordingly.
***We have adjusted the y-axis on 480ms rather than 0ms, so the interaction caused by the 
longer response times to Target MisMatch compared to TargetMatch when the distracter was 
present is more visible.
7. The shape-matching task was an adapted version of a task developed by DeSchepper 
and Trieseman, 1996. How was the task modified with respect to the original version and 
why? 
***We reduced the number of trials to 112 across 4 blocks rather than 200. The task was also 
simplified to measure resistance to distracters and resistance to inappropriate responses, 
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rather than negative priming as in DeSchepper and Treisman (1996). This was done by 
presenting the distracter shapes at the same time as target shapes in the experimental trials, 
requiring participants to actively keep the distracters from interfering with processing of the 
target shapes (Endo, Saiki & Sato, 2001).
We have added the following to section A2 of Appendix A (executive task details):
The task was simplified to measure resistance to distracters and resistance to 
inappropriate responses, rather than negative priming as in DeSchepper and Treisman 
(1996). This was done by presenting the distracter shapes at the same time as target 
shapes in the experimental trials, requiring participants to actively keep the distracters 
from interfering with processing of the target shapes (Endo, Saiki & Sato, 2001).
Endo, N., Saiki, J. & Saito, H. (2001). Determinants of occurrence of negative priming for 
novel shapes with matching paradigm. Japanese Journal of Psychology, 72 (3), 204 – 212
8. The method section lacks important details about the visual stimuli (stimulus size, 
duration…), responses recording, number of trials….etc…
***We have added a section for this (A2) in Appendix A (executive task details).
9. The path analysis, as well as the results, need to be described in more details in the 
main text, especially for the reader who is not familiar with this kind of approach, and not 
only in the appendix.
***Thank you for this advice. We have added a brief summary of the aim of path analysis to 
the start of the Models sub-section (page 14; “Path analysis aims to arrive at the most 
parsimonious model that explains the underlying data and does not significantly differ from 
it. Increasing the number of parameters in a model tends to improve fit, but necessarily 
decreases parsimony. The best model optimises fit and parsimony.” We have also given more 
detail on each model in the main results (while keeping the full tables/figures in Appendix B 
for brevity), including information on model comparisons (pages 14 – 15).
10. I am wondering whether having a fixed task order was the right choice. As tasks are 
supposed to measure similar constructs, it is plausible that performance in one task has an 
influence on the performance of subsequent tasks. Counterbalancing the task order should 
have controlled this. 
***This is a very good point, and one we did not fully explain. We decided on a fixed order 
because this is widely-acknowledged to be the most powerful design in individual differences 
research (e.g. Carlson & Moses, 2001; Carlson et al., 2004; Friedman & Miyake, 2004; 
Miyake et al., 2000; Miyake, Friedman, Rettinger, Shah & Hegarty, 2001). While the patterns 
of correlation between tasks should be the same for any task order, variation in order within a 
sample introduces irrelevant variance that can obscure correlations. To illustrate, consider 
tasks A and B that are highly correlated, such that the true rank order of participants’ 
performance is the same on A and B. Now suppose A and B are presented in a battery on 
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which participant tiredness naturally leads to decreasing performance over time. In a fixed 
order design in which task A always occurs before B, performance on B will be 
underestimated compared with A, but the true rank order of participants on each task will be 
preserved. In contrast, a design that varies task order makes it possible that a participants’ 
rank on any one task may shift above or below that of other participants on that task just 
because they happened to complete the tasks in different orders (and so varied in levels of 
tiredness). This reduces the power for detecting the true association that exists between the 
tasks. 
Fixing the task order avoids this problem, but we note that a given task order may result such 
a degree of tiredness that task performance can no longer be assessed reliably. To check 
whether the performance on tasks influenced one another, perhaps due to there being a finite 
resource for executive components (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), participants completed 
the Go / No-Go task at the start and end of each session, and results compared. These showed 
no difference, suggesting that fatigue and/or influence of similar tasks on performance did not 
occur.
We have added the following to the Task order section: This was done because a fixed task 
order is optimal for detecting correlations (e.g. Carlson & Moses, 2001; Carlson et al., 
2004; Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Miyake et al., 2000; Miyake, Friedman, Rettinger, Shah & 
Hegarty, 2001). To check whether the performance on tasks influenced one another, 
perhaps due to there being a finite resource for executive components (Muraven & 
Baumeister, 2000), participants completed the Go / No-Go task at the start and end of 
each session, and results compared. These showed no difference, suggesting that fatigue 
and/or influence of similar tasks on performance did not occur.
11. The Director task is a typical explicit task, because subjects are always instructed to 
take the perspective of the avatar. The L1 VPT task is, on the other hand, at least partially 
implicit (the effect of the avatar’s perspective is automatic in “self” trials). A possible 
dissociation between implicit and explicit ToM is a matter of intense debate. I wonder 
whether one should not consider the interference effect in “self” and “other” trials separately. 
Possible implicit/explicit dissociation might come to help in the interpretation of the path 
analysis outcome.
***Thank you for this suggestion. We certainly recognise this interesting issue. Our analysis 
strategy derives from the challenges in deriving maximally informative dependent variables 
from tasks that obviously involve multiple processes. To illustrate, the magnitude of the 
altercentric interference effect in a Self trial is likely to depend on BOTH the propensity for a 
participant to process the avatar’s perspective (or the weight or salience they accord that 
perspective), AND the participants’ capacity to give a controlled response in the face of 
interference from the avatar’s perspective. With appropriate changes made, the same analysis 
applies to egocentric interference on Other trials. [Note also, an analogous analysis would 
apply to alternative interpretations of this effect in terms of spatial cueing.] Following 
Bukowski & Samson, our strategy is to orthogonalise these factors, to derive indices of focus 
(weighting of self vs other) and conflict (ability to resolve self-other interference). We think 
this is maximally informative, but we agree that, since much of the published literature has 
looked separately at interference on Self and Other trials, it is also informative to look at 
these trials separately. Therefore in Appendix C we now present models using interference 
measures (from self perspective; egocentric interference, and other perspective; altercentric 
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interference). Results show that interference from the self perspective is related to the SST, 
but that interference from the other perspective is not related to any of the executive tasks. 
We have made a note to this effect in the result section.
12. Page 5, first line: “….implicated in analogous non-social executive control(”.  Please 
also see:
Brass, M., Derrfuss, J., & von Cramon, D. Y. (2005). The inhibition of imitative and 
overlearned responses: a functional double dissociation. Neuropsychologia, 43, 89–98. 
Brass, M., Ruby, P., & Spengler, S. (2009). Inhibition of imitative behaviour and social 
cognition. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological 
Sciences, 364(1528), 2359–67. 
Darda & Ramsey. (2019). The inhibition of automatic imitation: a meta-analysis and 
synthesis of previous studies. Biorxiv.
Moreover, this work seems to be relevant to the discussion and should be at least mentioned: 
Conway, Catmur and Bird (2019). Understanding individual differences in theory of mind via 
representation of minds, not mental states. Psychon. Bull. Rev. In press.
***Thank you for bringing this literature to our attention. We have added lines and 
references to the section on non-social executive control (page 5), and also a line referencing 
the ‘Mind-space’ framework as a way to move forward with individual differences research 
in theory of mind to the discussion.
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2
Abstract
Theory of mind (ToM), the ability to understand other agents have different beliefs, desires 
and knowledge to oneself, has been extensively researched. Theory of mind tasks involve 
participants dealing with interference between their self-perspective and another agents 
perspective, and this interference has been related to executive function, particularly 
inhibitory control. The current study assessed whether there are individual differences in 
self/other interference, and whether these effects are due to individual differences in 
executive function. 142 participants completed two theory of mind tasks (the Director Task 
and a level one visual perspective-taking task), which both involve self-other interference, 
and a battery of inhibitory control tasks. The relationships between the tasks were examined 
using path analysis. Results showed that the self/other interference effects of the two ToM 
tasks were dissociable, with individual differences in performance on the ToM tasks being 
unrelated and performance in each predicted by different inhibitory control tasks. We suggest 
that self/other differences are part of the nature of theory of mind tasks, but self/other 
interference is not a unitary construct. Instead, self/other differences result in interference 
effects in a variety of ways and at different stages of processing, and these effects may not be 
a major limiting step for adults’ performance on typical ToM tasks. Further work is needed to 
assess other factors that may limit adults’ ToM performance and hence explain individual 
differences in social ability.
Key words: Theory of mind; Executive Function; Self/other interference; Path analysis
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Introduction
Theory of mind (ToM) has been defined as the ability to understand that other agents have 
different beliefs, desires and knowledge to oneself (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). While 
neurotypical adults clearly understand the principle that other people may have a different 
perspective to themselves (perhaps unlike children e.g. Perner & Ruffman, 2005; though see 
Onishi & Bailargeon, 2005), they nonetheless are prone to systematic difficulties arising from 
conflict between their own perspective (self-perspective) and another’s. Most notably, adult 
participants show “egocentrism” across a very wide range of tasks, whereby their judgment 
of what someone else sees, thinks, or wants is slower or more error-prone when this differs 
from what participants themselves see, think, or want (Royzman, Cassidy & Baron, 2003). 
Understanding the nature and origin of such interference effects is critical for theories about 
the functional bases of ToM, and understanding variability in these effects between 
individuals holds out the promise of helping explain why some people are more socially able 
than others (e.g., Apperly, 2012). Despite the recent proliferation of tasks available for 
studying ToM in adults, little is yet known about individual differences in ToM performance. 
Therefore the present study addressed two fundamental questions: Are there systematic 
individual differences in self-other interference; and are these effects due to individual 
differences in executive functions?
Studies of ToM in adults have focussed on both typical and atypical participants. Specifically, 
research has examined healthy young adults (e.g., Bradford, Jentzsch & Gomes, 2015; 
Qureshi & Monk, 2018), and older adults (Bernstein, Thornton & Sommerville, 2011), 
patients with brain injury (e.g., Apperly, Samson & Humphreys, 2005; Stone, Baron-Cohen 
& Knight, 1998), those with Autism Spectrum Disorder (e.g., Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, 
Mortimore & Robertson, 1997), psychopathy (e.g., Lockwood, Bird, Bridge & Viding, 2013) 
and dementia (e.g., Le Bouc, Lenfant, Delbeuck, Ravasi, Lebert, Semah & Pasquier, 2012). 
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4
Research in this area has also utilised a variety of different methodologies including dual-
tasking (e.g., Bull, Phillips & Conway, 2008; Qureshi, Apperly & Samson, 2010), brain 
stimulation (e.g., Kalbe et al., 2010), neuro-imaging (e.g., Reiniers, Völlm, Elliott & 
Corcoran, 2014) and individual differences (Ryskin, Benjamin, Tullis & Brown-Schmidt, 
2015). Nevertheless, a unifying feature of the tasks is that they generate a difference between 
the perspective of the participant (self-perspective) and that of the target (other-perspective), 
with the resulting interference between the self and other perspectives requiring resolution in 
order to judge what the other thinks, sees, or feels. This gives rise to the widely-reported 
phenomenon of “egocentric bias” towards the participant’s own perspective, which is almost 
universally observed in studies of ToM (Royzman, Cassidy & Baron, 2003; Wellman, 2014). 
However, it is currently unclear whether self-other interference results from the same 
underlying functional process on different tasks. While everyday experience lends credibility 
to the hypothesis that some individuals are consistently more egocentric than others, few 
studies have examined whether this is the case.
One leading hypothesis is that interference between self and other perspectives in 
ToM tasks forms part of a broader domain of phenomena in which representations relating to 
self and other must be controlled (e.g., Cook, 2014). For example, observing another’s action 
generates a tendency for “automatic imitation” of the action by one’s self, which must be 
controlled if it is not the action required by the task or ongoing activity (Brass, Bekkering, 
Wohlschläger & Prinz, 2000). Santiesteban, White, Cook, Gilbert, Heyes and Bird (2012) 
found that training participants to inhibit automatic imitation improved performance on a test 
that required participants to use their ToM (the Director Task; Keysar, Lin & Barr, 2003), 
whereas training generic inhibition did not, suggesting that inhibition of automatic imitation 
and ToM rely on control over representations related to self and other, and these control 
processes are not the same as those involved in conventional “inhibition” tasks. Moreover, 
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self-other control appears to depend upon regions of medial prefrontal cortex and temporo-
parietal cortex that are distinct from more lateral prefrontal brain regions frequently 
implicated in analogous non-social executive control (Bardi, Six & Brass, 2017; Brass, Ruby 
& Spengler, 2009; Brass, Derrfuss & von Cramon, 2004; Wagner, Maril, Bjork & Schacter, 
2001). Such findings suggest that the same self-other control process may underlie both 
imitation inhibition and perspective-taking, and that self-other control processes are in an 
important sense “domain-specific”, and distinct from domain-general executive functions (as 
generic inhibition training did not improve ToM performance; though see a recent meta-
analysis by Darda and Ramsey (2019)). This clearly leads to the prediction that there will be 
reliable individual differences in self-other control across different ToM tasks, and that these 
should not be related to individual differences in generic executive function.
However, there is also substantial evidence suggesting that domain-general executive 
function is involved in ToM, and in particular in self-other control. Research on both children 
(Carlson & Moses, 2001; Carlson, Moses & Breton, 2002, Carlson, Moses & Claxton, 2004) 
and adults (German & Hehman, 2006; Bradford, Jentzsch & Gomez, 2015) has shown a 
relationship between EF and ToM, and this has been suggested to explain deficits and 
impairments in ToM performance (Bull et al., 2008; McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007). While 
there is some evidence of a role for working memory (e.g., Qureshi & Monk, 2018; Ryskin et 
al., 2015), inhibitory control has been frequently linked with enabling the participant to 
control interference between self and other perspectives in order to select the one required by 
the task. For example Qureshi, Apperly and Samson (2010) found that a secondary task 
taxing inhibitory control disproportionately impaired perspective-taking on trials involving 
self-other conflict compared with trials without conflict (see also Todd, Cameron & Simpson, 
2017). Moreover, there is converging evidence from research using EEG, fMRI,  
neurospsychological studies of patients with brain injury, as well as TMS, that the inferior 
Page 14 of 89Psychonomic Bulletin & Review submission
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
6
frontal gyrus – a brain region frequently implicated in generic inhibitory control – is involved 
in managing self-other conflict when it arises during visual perspective-taking (e.g., 
McCleery et al., 2011; Ramsey et al., 20013) and reasoning about false beliefs (e.g., 
Hartwright et al., 2012, 2016; Samson et al., 2005, 2016). This evidence leads to the 
prediction that individual differences in self-other control on ToM tasks could be related to 
individual differences in generic executive control (in particular inhibitory control). This 
evidence would also be consistent with reliable correlations in self-other control across 
different ToM tasks, but such relationships should be mediated by individual differences in 
domain-general executive control, rather than by any specific process for self-other control. 
Importantly, this way of thinking about ToM tasks also allows for the possibility that though 
self-other control is typically assumed to be a coherent process common to all ToM tasks, 
egocentrism and other self/other interference effects are instead a “family” of phenomena that 
can arise in different ways across different tasks or situations. On such an account self-other 
interference effects may not correlate across different ToM tasks but would correlate with 
executive function tasks. The pattern of those correlations would then depend upon when and 
how self-other interference arises during the ToM task, and the particular executive demands 
that arose as a result. 
In the largest individual differences study of ToM to date, the current study therefore 
examines the relationship between performance on inhibitory control tasks and two ToM 
tasks that both involve dealing with interference between self and other perspectives. The two 
ToM tasks used were a Level 1 Visual Perspective Taking (L1-VPT) Task (Samson et 
al.,2010) and the Director Task (based on the experiment of Keysar, Lin & Barr, 2003). 
The L1-VPT Task requires participants to judge how many dots appear on the walls 
of a room either from their own perspective or from the perspective of an avatar in the room. 
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7
This involves control processes relating to the ability to regulate the choice of responses (e.g., 
perspective selection) as well as more automatic processes which are associated with the 
calculation of an ‘other’ perspective (see Qureshi, Apperly & Samson, 2010). In terms of 
individual differences, this task has recently been used to create separate measures of 
“conflict” (relating to the interference between self and other perspectives) and “focus” 
(relative ease of judgements relating to self versus other; Bukowski & Samson, 2017). These 
measures allow the separation of two components that may contribute to successful 
perspective-taking, but which are confounded in standard measures of speed or accuracy of 
judging the perspectives of others. 
The Director task involves the participant following the instructions of a director who 
has a spatially opposite perspective to their own, and moving objects that are mutually visible 
(target objects) while avoiding objects visible only to the participant (competitor objects; 
Apperly et al., 2010). This task therefore also requires participants to resolve interference 
between self and other perspectives, though errors appear to arise not from difficulty with 
taking the director’s perspective, but with integrating this perspective with the director’s 
message in order to constrain reference (Barr, 2008).
Path analyses were used to model the relationship between four inhibitory control 
tasks and measures of ToM tasks. Given the near ubiquity of egocentric effects and other 
self/other interference effects, it is plausible that these effects reflect a common underlying 
process, with shared variance such that someone who shows (say) high self/other interference 
on one task will also show high interference on another. Prediction 1: This observation 
predicts a significant path between measures of self/other interference in the different ToM 
tasks; an important prediction that has received little empirical attention to date (see Ryskin et 
al., 2015 for an exception in the context of perspective-taking during communication). 
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Prediction 2: If inhibitory control is required for dealing with self/other perspective 
interference and egocentrism (failures to inhibit self-perspective), paths would be expected 
between inhibitory control and ToM. Prediction 3: If predictions 1 and 2 are both supported 
then the domain-general account of self-other control predicts that the relationships between 
self-other interference on different ToM tasks will be fully mediated by inhibitory control, 
whereas the domain-specific account of self-other control predicts that it will not be 
mediated. Prediction 4: If only Prediction 2 is supported and if self-other interference arises 
in different ways for different ToM tasks, then self-other interference on different ToM tasks 
might correlate with different inhibition tasks.
Method
Participants
One hundred and fifty-four university student participants took part in the study for course 
credits or cash payment. Participant ages ranged from 18 to 44 (M = 21.8, SD = 4.4), with 31 
males and seven who were left-handed (two of whom used their right hand normally). Ethical 
approval was gained from the departmental ethics committee.
Materials
All the experiments were designed and presented on a 15-inch Samsung SyncMaster 793s 
monitor connected to a 3.00 GHz Pentium based desktop PC using EPrime 1.1 (Schneider, 
Eschmann & Zuccolotto, 2002), apart from the visual perspective task which was presented 
using DMDX (Forster & Forster, 2003). A standard 102 keyboard was used for responses. 
Inhibitory Control tasks
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Based on Friedman and Miyake (2004), we chose tasks that required inhibition at different 
stages of processing, including resistance to distracting stimuli, resistance to distracting 
information held in working memory, and resistance to selecting a prepotent but incorrect 
response. Further details on the choice of tasks (A1), task methodology (A2) and all 
individual task results (A3) are shown in Appendix A, where two further IC tasks are 
described, a Simon task and a Cued Recall task1. These were not included in the final 
analyses due to having no relationship with any of the other tasks in the model and low 
reliability respectively.
Shape-Matching
Participants were shown a green target shape and a white shape (see. DeSchepper & 
Trieseman, 1996). On 50% of trials there was a red distracter shape placed over the target. 
Participants were asked to decide if the target matched the white shape. The dependent 
variable for the path analysis model was the difference in response times (to correct trials) 
between the two distracter present conditions and the two distracter absent conditions 
((distracter present match + distracter present no-match)/2 – (distracter absent match + 
distracter absent no-match)/2)). 
Stop-signal
Participants were presented with stimuli (“O” or “X”) and instructed to respond by pressing 
the same key on the keyboard (Go trials: 75% of all trials), apart from Stop trials (25%) - 
trials in which a tone was heard at a set delay (stop-signal delay; SSD) after presentation of 
the stimulus. The SSD followed a dynamic tracking procedure starting at 250ms, and 
increased by 50ms on a correct (non-)response, and decreased by 50ms on an incorrect 
1 The original design selected two sets of 3 inhibitory control tasks as indicators for two latent variables for 
cognitive and response inhibition. However, the covariance structure did not support this theoretically motivated 
distinction between latent variables, and so tasks with adequate measurement properties were instead utilised as 
individual predictors.
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response (to stop trials). Stop-signal reaction time (SSRT) was calculated as mean Go RT – 
mean Stop RT.
Go/No-Go (letter-based)
Participants were shown serially presented letters on-screen that they were required to 
respond to by pressing the spacebar (go trials) (Wager et al., 2005). This was the requirement 
for all letters except for the letter K (no go trial; 13.85% of all trials). The dependent variable 
was the False Alarm Rate (FAR) for No-Go trials.
Go/No-Go (image-based)
This task was based on the study of Schmitt et al. (2000) and required a two-step process to 
respond correctly: the initial step was based on semantic information (image of either a bird 
or a mammal) and the go / no go step on phonological or orthographical information (Go trial 
= initial letter was a consonant, No Go trial = initial letter was a vowel; van Turennout et al., 
1997). The measure taken was the FAR to no go trials.
ToM tasks
Visual perspective-taking is widely regarded as an important component of children’s 
developing ToM (e.g., Wellman, 2014) and of the mature ToM abilities of adults (e.g., 
Apperly, 2010). We selected two tasks that have been widely-used in laboratory 
investigations of ToM in adults, and for which there were task analyses of component 
processes to which inhibition might contribute: the L1-VPT task requires calculation of 
another person’s visual perspective; the Director Task requires calculation of another 
person’s perspective, plus the use of this information to interpret their instructions. In the 
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discussion we evaluate the implications for the present work of alternative interpretations of 
these tasks.
L1-VPT task
The visual perspective-taking task used the stimuli and procedure of Experiment 1 in Samson 
et al. (2010). The stimuli consisted of a picture showing a lateral view into a room with the 
left, back and right walls visible and with red dots displayed on one or two walls (stimuli 
were created using the 3D animation program Poser 6, © Curious Lab). A centrally 
positioned human avatar faced either the left or right wall (Table 2). On 50% of trials the 
avatar’s position meant that s/he saw the same dots as the participants (Consistent condition). 
On 50% of trials the avatar’s position meant that s/he could not see some of the dots that were 
visible to the participants (Inconsistent condition). Indices of Conflict (inconsistent – 
consistent perspectives) and Focus (self-perspective – other perspective) were calculated as 
per Bukowski and Samson (2017). Inverse Efficiency Scores (IES; response time / 1 – error 
rate) were calculated for these conditions2. A higher value in the Conflict index indicated 
greater difficulty in handling conflicting perspectives, while positive values in the Focus 
index indicated better performance in taking the other person’s perspective than the self- 
perspective (more altercentric rather than egocentric). 
Director task
In a 4 x 4 experimental grid, a critical instruction was given by the director that could refer to 
a target object (mutually visible to the participant and instructor), or to a competitor object 
(located in one of the covered slots, and so visible only to the participant). In order to choose 
2 Use of IES is not recommended if speed-accuracy trade-offs are shown (indicated by no positive correlation 
between response times and error rates) and if the average error rate is above .10 (see Bukowski & Samson, 
2017). The correlation between response time and error rate was positive (r (142) = .20, p < .01), and the mean 
error rate across conditions was 0.06 (standard deviation = 0.07), meaning both recommendations for using IES 
were met.
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the target object, the participant needed to consider the instructor’s perspective. The 
remaining objects in the grid were unrelated. In the equivalent control grids, the competitor 
object was replaced by another unrelated object. 
The measure taken was the number of errors made to ambiguous trials (where the item in the 
instruction could refer to a competitor and a target object such as ‘mouse’ referring to either a 
computer mouse or a small mammal, for instance) and relational trials (where the best fitting 
object to the instruction was not mutually visible. For example, referring to a ‘small ball’, 
where the smallest ball was a golf ball only visible to the participant, but the smallest 
mutually visible ball was a tennis ball). 
Task order
The order of the tasks was fixed so that participants were exposed to identical stimulus 
contexts (stimuli and order;see Carlson & Moses, 2001; Carlson et al., 2004; Friedman & 
Miyake, 2004; Miyake et al., 2000; Miyake, Friedman, Rettinger, Shah & Hegarty, 2001). 
This was done because a fixed task order is optimal for detecting correlations (e.g. Carlson & 
Moses, 2001; Carlson et al., 2004; Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Miyake et al., 2000; Miyake, 
Friedman, Rettinger, Shah & Hegarty, 2001). To check whether the performance on tasks 
influenced one another, perhaps due to there being a finite resource for executive components 
(Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), participants completed the Go / No-Go task at the start and 
end of each session, and results compared. These showed no difference, suggesting that 
fatigue and/or influence of similar tasks on performance did not occur.
The overall task order was as follows:
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Go / No Go Task - L1 VPT (ToM) - Shape-Matching Task - Go / No Go Task (response 
inhibition)3 - Stop-signal Task - Director Task (ToM) - Go / No Go (picture) Task. The tasks 
were split into two sessions. The first session lasted for approximately 70 minutes and 
consisted of the Go / No Go, Visual Perspective and Shape-Matching tasks, as well as the 
repeat of the Go / No Go task4. The second session also lasted for approximately 90 minutes 
and consisted of the Stop-Signal, Director and Go / No Go (picture)5. There were breaks 
within each task and between each task, so that participants were not tested continuously for 
the period of the sessions. Participants did the sessions on the same day (with a break 
between them) or on separate days (maximum gap between sessions was three weeks). 
Analytical procedure
Data screening
The data set was checked for univariate outliers, and pairwise plots examined for any 
heteroscedasticity. Multivariate outliers were checked as per Tabachnick and Fidell (2001), 
resulting in 12 participants being excluded. Variances for the dependent variables were 
adjusted to all be within a 10:1 ratio (Kline, 2005). The final sample for analysis consisted of 
142 participants (M age = 21.76, SD age = 4.37), with 28 males. This resulted in a total of 
1132 data points. 
After variance adjustment and transformations, the final descriptive statistics for the 
dependent and independent variables were as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Final task descriptives
Measure M (SD) Variance Reliability6
3 This was a repeat of the first task in the session to compare performance at the start to the end of the session to 
see the effect of a.) fatigue on performance, and b.) the possibility of the reduction in the resource of self-control 
affecting performance by the end of the session (Muraven & Baumeister, 2001). 
4 And the Simon Task which was not included in the final analyses
5 And Cued Recall task which was also not included in the final analyses
6 Split-half reliabilities
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Shape-Matching (ms) (square root transformation) 21.56 (4.88) 23.77 .92
Go / No Go (FAR) 4.28 (2.12) 4.51 .93
Go / No Go (picture) (FAR; Bird/Mammal)7 6.17 (3.05) 9.28 .74
Stop-Signal (SSRT) (log 10 transformation) 16.33 (6.74) 45.52 .99
Director Task (errors) (log 10 transformation)
   Ambiguous
   Relational
2.34 (2.41)
2.75 (2.66)
5.79
7.07
.59
.83
Visual Perspective Indices (IES)
Conflict
Focus
3.62 (2.25)
-.07 (2.13)
5.06
4.55
.85
.88
An initial correlation matrix between the variables is shown in Table 2. For the inhibitory 
control tasks, positive correlations were shown between the Shape-Matching and Stop-Signal 
tasks, the Go/No-Go and Go/No-Go (picture) tasks and the Go/No-Go and Stop-Signal tasks. 
While these are relatively low, this is common for tasks measuring inhibition (e.g. Friedman 
& Miyake, 2004) and may reflect task impurity. A positive correlation was shown between 
the Director task variables, and a negative one between the L1 VPT variables. The Shape-
Matching task had positive correlations with both the Director (relational) variable, while the 
Go/No-Go (picture) task had positive correlations with both measures of the Director task. 
The Stop-Signal task also had a positive correlation with the L1 VPT (Conflict) variable.
Table 2. Correlation matrix between variables
 Shape Matching
Go 
NoGo
Go 
NoGo 
(picture)
Stop-
Signal
Director 
Task 
(ambiguous)
Director 
Task 
(relational)
Visual 
Perspective 
(Conflict)
Go NoGo -.04 -
Go NoGo 
(picture) .00 .23** -
Stop-Signal .15 .18* .08 -
Director 
(ambiguous) .09 .00 .34** .02 -
Director 
(relational) .29** .01 .25** .05 .65** -
Visual 
Perspective 
(Conflict)
.06 .14 .00 .24** -.03 -.04 -
Visual 
Perspective 
(Focus)
-.02 .08 -.04 .02 .02 -.03 -.18*
* p < .05, ** p < .01
7 As FAR for the bird and mammal trials were significantly correlated and followed the same pattern, they were 
collapsed to form a single FAR for the go / no go (picture) task
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Models
Analyses were carried out using AMOS 25. Path analysis aims to arrive at the most 
parsimonious model that explains the underlying data and does not significantly differ from 
it. Increasing the number of parameters in a model tends to improve fit, but necessarily 
decreases parsimony. The best model optimises fit and parsimony.
While the correlation matrix suggests that for the L1 VPT task, there was only a relationship 
between inhibitory control and the Conflict Index, in order to test the hypothesis that 
inhibitory control accounts for self/other perspective interference and egocentrism, paths 
from all inhibitory control tasks to all ToM measures were included in Model 1 (Figure 1, 
Appendix B). In the second model, all non-significant paths were removed (Figure 2, 
Appendix B). In model 3, covariances between the inhibitory control variables that were 
suggested by modification indices were added. This resulted in the final model (Figure 1) 
which outlines paths from differing inhibitory control variables to both Director task 
variables and the Conflict index of the L1 VPT task. This model also evidenced relationships 
between the inhibitory control variables. Due to the sample size and number of parameters, 
Bollen-Stine bootstrap analyses were conducted to more robustly assess model fit.
Results
Full descriptions, figures and tables for models 1 and 2 are shown in Appendix B and 
described in brief below.
Initial Model
No relationships were found between the Go / No-Go or Stop-Signal tasks and either of the 
Director task variables. The Go / No-Go (picture) task predicted performance on both 
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ambiguous and relational variables of the Director task, while the Shape-Matching task only 
predicted performance on the relational variable. The Stop-Signal task predicted performance 
on the L1 VPT Conflict Index, and no tasks predicted performance on the L1 VPT Focus 
Index.
Model 2
Non-significant paths were removed, resulting in only the paths described in the initial 
model. Model comparisons suggested that removing these paths did not significantly affect 
the overall model fit (Χ2 (12) = 6.29, p = .90). 
Final model (model 3)
For model 3, covariances between th  Go / No-Go and Go / No-Go (picture) tasks and 
between the Go / No-Go and the SST task were added (Figure ). This significantly improved 
the model fit (Χ2 (2) = 11.38 p < .01).  
Figure 1. Model 3 (standardised coefficients)
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The parameter estimates in Table 3 show that approximately 6% of the variance in the 
Conflict index was explained by the model, with around 11-12% of the variance of the 
director task (for both ambiguous and relational DVs) explained. 
Table 3. Parameter estimates for final model (model 3)
Path Unstandardised Estimate (Standard Error) Standardised Estimate
Shape-matching →Director 
(relational) .13 (.03) .24***
Go/No-Go → Director (relational)
Go/No-Go (picture) → Director 
(relational) .22 (.07) .26***
SST → Director (relational)
Shape-matching →Director 
(ambiguous)
Go/No-Go → Director (ambiguous)
Go/No-Go (picture) → Director 
(ambiguous) .26 (.06) .34***
SST → Director (ambiguous)
SST → L1 VPT (Conflict) .08 (.03) .25***
Covariances Unstandardised Estimate (Standard Error) Standardised Estimate
Director (relational) ↔ Director 
(ambiguous) 3.47 (.55) .63***
L1 VPT (Conflict) ↔L1 VPT 
(Focus) -.89 (.40) -.19***
Go/No-Go ↔ SST 2.29 (1.18) .16*
Go/No-Go ↔ Go/No-Go (picture) 1.38 (.55) .22*
Variances Estimate (Standard Error)
Shape-Matching 23.60 (2.81)***
Go/No-Go 4.46 (.53)***
Go/No-Go (picture) 9.22 (1.10)***
SST 45.20 (5.38)***
e1 (Director (relational)) 5.99 (.72)***
e2 (Director (ambiguous)) 5.10 (.61)***
e3 (L1 VPT (Conflict)) 4.51 (.54)***
e4 (L1 VPT (Focus)) 4.73 (.56)***
Squared Multiple Correlations
Director (relational) .12
Director (ambiguous) .11
L1 VPT (Conflict) .06
L1 VPT (Focus) .00
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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The model parameters for the final model (Model 3; Table 4) show that the fit was excellent.
Table 4. Model fit parameters
CMIN df p NFI CFI AIC RMSEA Low High Bollen-Stine Bootstrap p 
Model 1 17.35 10 .07 .88 .94 69.35 .07 .00 .13 .14
Model 2 23.64 22 .37 .84 .99 51.64 .02 .00 .08 .36
Model 3 12.26 20 .91 .92 1.00 44.26 .00 .00 .03 .87
A power analysis was conducted on the final model fit values and sample size using Preacher 
and Coffman’s (2006) power and sample size calculator for RMSEA. This suggests that the 
current sample size has a power of .92 to detect whether this was a poor fitting model8. 
Testing whether the sample size was sufficient for the final model showed that an ideal 
sample size should be 107 (with .10 as the RMSEA value for a poor fit; Kenny, 20149). Kline 
(2005) suggests a 10:1 ratio for free parameters as a realistic figure, which gives an estimated 
sample size of 80 for the final model. The current sample size is therefore appropriate for the 
current analyses.
Discussion
In the largest study to date, this research examines individual differences in adults’ 
performance on two ToM tasks, with a particular focus on their ability to manage interference 
between self and other perspectives. Since this individual difference approach is relatively 
novel in relation to ToM in adult participants, it is noteworthy that two widely-used tasks – 
the Director Task (Keysar, Lin & Barr, 2003) and the Level-1 Visual Perspective-Taking 
Task (Samson et al., 2010) each showed reliable measurement characteristics. Moreover, 
performance on the two minor trial variants within the Director Task was strongly correlated. 
8 Observed power = .8, df = 20, n =142, null RMSEA = .01 (excellent fit), alternative RMSEA = .00 (final 
model value).
9 Observed power = .8, df = 20, null RMSEA = .01, alternative RMSEA = .10
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For the L1 VPT task, the relationship between Focus and Conflict indices was negative, 
suggesting that those better at handling conflicting perspectives were more likely to be better 
at taking the ‘other’ perspective10. 
Against this background of successful measurement there was a striking lack of any 
relationship between indices of these effects in the Director Task and L1-VPT. There was no 
evidence that the need to control interference between self and other perspectives drew upon 
a common process in these two tasks (no support for Prediction 1), whether that is a common 
process specific to self/other control (Bardi, Six & Brass, 2017) or a common process that 
relies on domain general executive control (Bull et al., 2008; German & Hehman, 2006; 
McKinnon & Moskovitch, 2007). Self/other interference in the two ToM tasks was correlated 
with measures of domain-general executive control (support for Prediction 2). However, each 
ToM task correlated with different executive control tasks. Since no relationship was 
observed between measures of self/other control, we could not examine whether such a 
relationship would be mediated by domain-general executive control (Prediction 3).
These results are surprising in light of the convergent evidence presented in the 
introduction suggesting that self/other interference and egocentrism are very commonly 
reported phenomena across multiple ToM tasks and other social tasks. Debate has mainly 
concerned whether the process for handling such interference is specific to self/other control, 
or domain-general (e.g., Cook, 2014; Happe et al., 2017; Hartwright et al., 2016). The 
underlying assumption that we are studying one phenomenon is usually taken for granted. Of 
course we must be cautious about rejecting this assumption, particularly on the basis of the 
absence of predicted effects. In what follows, we first consider whether our tasks were 
suitable for use as measures of individual differences in self/other interference. We next 
10 Lower Conflict index indicates better at dealing with conflicting perspectives; Higher Focus index suggests 
relatively better performance when taking ‘other’ perspective compared to self-perspective.
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consider whether resolution of self/other interference is a limiting step for healthy adults. 
Finally, we consider whether self/other interference might in fact be a family of phenomena. 
Given the currently limited evidence on individual differences in ToM in adults, we hope this 
discussion will both help interpretation of our findings and guide badly-needed further work 
on this topic.
Limitations in ToM measures?
Both the Level-1 Visual Perspective-taking Task and the Director Task generated the 
anticipated self/other interference effects and measured individual differences in performance 
reliably. However, this does not entail that they reliably measured individual variability in 
self/other interference (we also note that while task reliabilities were generally high (< .7) the 
reliability for ambiguous errors in the Director task was .59). It is important to acknowledge 
that both tasks were devised as laboratory platforms to investigate egocentrism and self/other 
interference, primarily through manipulation of task conditions that might affect 
performance. As recently discussed in the context of individual differences in executive 
control (Friedman & Miyake, 2017; Hedge et al., 2018), such laboratory tasks are typically 
developed to minimise individual differences between the performance of participants, in 
order to maximise the chances of observing between-condition effects. 
In response to such limitations, a small number of other tasks have been specifically designed 
to quantify individual differences in ToM (see Apperly, 2012). However, these tasks generate 
variance by requiring more subtle or complicated judgements, and in doing so become more 
opaque with respect to the underlying processes contributing to variance (e.g., Apperly, 
2010). A significant objective for future work is therefore to devise new tasks that maximise 
individual differences, not just in overall “scores”, but in theoretically motivated processes 
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related to ToM, such as self-other interference (or perhaps other parameters related to minds, 
rather than representing mental states, Conway, Catmur and Bird, 2019). With this important 
caveat in mind, we nevertheless note that both the L1 VPT and the Director Task have 
previously shown evidence of construct validity, through correlations with well-established 
measures of individual differences relevant to social functioning (Focus scores for L1 VPT 
correlate with the Interpersonal Reactivity Index, Bukowski & Samson, 2017; Errors on the 
Director Rask correlate with traits related to both autism and schizophrenia, Abu-Akel et al., 
2015). We consequently believe the present findings are interpretable, given appropriate 
caution.
A further question is whether these tasks actually measure ToM at all, since recent 
evidence suggests that the processing they entail may not be domain-specific to ToM (e.g., 
Santiesteban, 2014, 2015, 2017). There has been longstanding discussion about the extent to 
which ToM relies upon distinctive cognitive processes. One position is that reasoning about 
mental states makes unique cognitive demands (e.g., Leslie., 1987) that are met by a domain-
specific module (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995; Leslie et al., 2004). A different, and widely-held 
position is that ToM is more domain-general, making similar cognitive demands to a much 
broader category of reasoning problems, including reasoning about signs, words and pictures, 
as well as counterfactual thinking (Perner & Leahy, 2016; Riggs et al., 1998; Roessler & 
Perner, 2013). Both positions are compatible with a significant role for executive processes in 
the performance of ToM tasks, but the domain-general account also allows that executive 
processes contribute directly to representing or reasoning about mental states. Researchers 
have long sought evidence of domain-specificity by comparing behavioural performance 
when participants reason about mental states versus pictures, signs, or other non-mental 
perspectives, with relatively few results supporting domain-specificity. For example, while 
children with autism perform worse on false belief tasks than comparable false photograph 
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tasks (Leslie & Thiass, 1992) they perform at similar levels on false belief and false sign 
tasks (Iao et al., 2014). Typically-developing children’s performance on false belief tasks is 
closely correlated with performance on false sign tasks (Leekam et al., 2008) as well as 
synonym judgement tasks (Doherty & Perner, 1998), all of which require reasoning about 
metarepresentations but not mental states (Perner & Leahy, 2016). In response to such results 
it has been argued that false belief tasks (and ToM more generally) make demands that are 
exacting, and meaningful in terms of understanding patterns of performance in children and 
adults, but these demands are not domain-specific to ToM (e.g., Apperly 2010). To our 
knowledge, nobody has used such results to argue that false belief tasks do not entail 
representing mental states. One reason for this might be that participants in these tasks are 
often directly requested to reason about mental states.
Specifically in relation to the L1VPT and Director tasks used in the current study, 
recent work that has tested the domain-specificity of these effects and found evidence that 
similar effects are obtained when the avatar is replaced with an arrow and when the director 
is replaced with a camera the view of which conditionalises their responses in the same way 
as the director (e.g., Santiesteban, 2014, 2015, 2017). These results fail to find support for the 
domain-specificity of the effects in the L1VPT and Director tasks, but as illustrated above, 
there is no necessary link between ToM and domain-specificity in accounts of ToM, and 
plenty of reasons for thinking that domain-general executive functions play central roles in 
enabling ToM. Moreover, while it cannot be ruled out that participants ignored instructions to 
think about the perspectives of the avatar and the director, we see no evidence for this (e.g., 
Apperly et al., 2010), and no reason why participants would have behaved in this way.
The concern that participants may not have been representing mental states at all has 
most force in the “self” condition of the L1VPT task in which participants were not explicitly 
asked to judge the avatar’s perspective. Instead putatively “implicit perspective-taking” is 
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inferred from interference effects on participants’ judgements of their own perspective. In 
this case it is informative to view results from the Self and Other trials separately (see 
Appendix C). These analyses find that the “altercentric interference” effect for Self trials is 
not related to any of the executive tasks in the present study, but it is related to “egocentric 
interference” on Other trials of the L1VPT task. Of course this evidence does not demonstrate 
that perspective-taking is occurring, and different patterns may have been obtained with 
different inhibition tasks. Nor would a significant correlation have demonstrated that 
perspective-taking was not occurring; it would not be surprising if the magnitude of 
interference from the avatar’s perspective varied as a function of an individual’s inhibitory 
capacity. However, as it stands, the present study provides no evidence that altercentric 
interference reflects domain general inhibition and not perspective-taking, which is the 
alternative hypothesis that has sometimes been proposed for this task (e.g. Heyes, 2014).
Is self/other control a limiting step for healthy adults?
Existing evidence suggests that self/other interference effects are particularly large in 
children (who have limited executive control; Steinbeis, 2016), in individuals with brain 
injury that has affected their capacity for executive control (e.g., Samson et al., 2005, 2016), 
and in healthy adults under cognitive load (e.g., Qureshi et al., 2010). Healthy adults without 
cognitive load also show self/other interference effects, and associated neural correlates 
(Cook, 2015; Steinbeis, 2016). However, the fact that healthy adults must resolve self/other 
interference in a given task does not mean that doing so is a limiting factor on their 
performance such that individuals might vary in their capacity to resolve this interference 
successfully. On this interpretation, there may be a common underlying process involved in 
self/other control across different tasks, but since all healthy adults could meet this need 
reliably it would not contribute to individual differences in performance that would correlate 
Page 32 of 89Psychonomic Bulletin & Review submission
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
24
between tasks. Correlations might only emerge if the ToM tasks placed sufficiently large 
demands on self/other control that healthy adults did vary in their capacity to meet these 
demands. Alternatively, the correlations that we did observe between self/other interference 
effects and measures of domain-general executive function could suggest that our tasks were 
indeed sufficiently taxing to generate at least some individual differences. However, these 
correlations accounted for only a small proportion of the variance in performance, and the 
fact that different executive tasks correlated with each ToM task calls into further question 
the proposition of a common self/other factor between the ToM tasks.
Self/other control and egocentrism may be a “family” of phenomena that place different 
executive demands.
It is a parsimonious hypothesis that all self/other interference effects arise from a 
common underlying process, but this may not be the best explanation for these phenomena. 
The need to distinguish mental states related to self and other surely is a core feature of ToM 
tasks, but it has been suggested that this feature can give rise to interference effects in 
different ways, and at different stages of processing (e.g., Apperly, 2010). This account 
would predict a “family” of self/other interference phenomena that resemble each other at a 
general level of description, but are not necessarily correlated because different demands are 
made at different stages of processing.  For example, in the L1 VPT task participants must 
both calculate the perspectives of self and other and select the correct response based on one 
or other of these perspectives (Qureshi et al., 2010). Evidence from event related potentials 
suggests that perspective calculation occurs first, and involves posterior cortex (putatively 
temporoparietal junction), while selection occurs later and involves the frontal cortex 
(putatively the right inferior frontal gyrus; McCleery et al., 2011). Importantly, both 
calculation and selection ERP effects are influenced by self/other consistency, but 
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participants’ response times and errors on this task appear to reflect the effect of self/other 
consistency on selection of a response according to the perspective required for that trial. The 
correlation observed in the present study between the conflict index from the L1 VPT task 
and the Stop Signal Task suggests that this selection may occur very late in processing, 
perhaps after responses according to both self and other perspectives have already been 
initiated.
In contrast, while the Director task requires level-1 visual perspective-taking, it 
additionally requires that information about the director’s perspective is integrated with his 
instructions about which objects to move. Studies of eye movements suggest that participants 
may process the director’s perspective in anticipation of his instruction, and that egocentric 
eye movements and errors originate in difficulty with the subsequent process of integrating 
this information with his instruction (Barr, 2008). The proposal that egocentric effects in the 
director task have a different functional origin from self/other interference effects in the L1 
VPT task may explain why these effects did not, themselves, correlate, and why different 
domain-general executive tasks were correlated with each effect11. 
Conclusion
From the largest exploration of individual differences in in ToM and inhibitory control to 
date, we found that self/other interference effects in L1 VPT and Director Task were 
dissociable. Individual differences in performance on the two tasks were unrelated, and 
differences in performance on each task were related to different tests of executive function. 
Both findings converge with recent evidence from individual differences in perspective-
taking during psycholinguistic tasks (Ryskin et al., 2015). We suggest that self/other 
11 A more specific discussion of the relationship between the individual executive tasks, and their relationships 
with the ToM tasks is in section A4 of Appendix A.
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differences are part of the essence of ToM tasks, but that they give rise to interference effects 
in a variety of ways, at different stages of processing, resulting in a variety of requirements 
for executive control processes. We also suggest that the requirement to resolve self/other 
interference may not be the only, or even the most significant, limiting step for healthy 
adults’ performance on typical tasks. Future work is needed to understand whether self/other 
interference sometimes places a higher burden for adults, and also to understand other factors 
that may limit adults’ ToM performance and so may explain individual differences in social 
ability.
This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, 
commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
The data and materials for all experiments are available on request from the lead author
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Appendix A1
IC task selection and predictions
The classification and choice of inhibitory control tasks was based on Friedman and Miyake 
(2004). Their initial classifications were designed to measure the different stages of the 
informational processing of inhibition. This starts with resistance to distracter interference 
(selecting relevant information and ignoring irrelevant information), followed by resistance to 
proactive interference (once information has entered working memory) and, finally, prepotent 
response inhibition (select relevant responses and resist incorrect ones). They found that 
resistance to distracter interference and prepotent response inhibition loaded on the same 
latent variable (defined as Response-Distracter Inhibition). As such, it was concluded that 
Response-Distracter Inhibition and Resistance to Proactive Interference are distinct 
components of inhibition (Friedman & Miyake, 2004). Our tasks we used were therefore 
originally chosen with the objective of identifying latent variables for these two components 
and then assessing their relationship to ToM.
In Friedman & Miyake (2004) Response-Distracter Inhibition tasks included the Go / No-Go 
task (though these also include some requirement for response selection), Stop-signal task 
and anti-saccade tasks. Due to laboratory infrastructure, the anti-saccade task could not be 
used, so we selected a variant Go/No-Go task where the Go and No-Go judgements were 
based on semantic and orthographic information, as opposed to perceptual information. This 
follows the principle that latent-variables are best estimated using tasks that differ in as many 
respects as possible other than the hypothesised underlying common process. From the tasks 
that Friedman and Miyake (2004) found to load on on the latent variable for Resistance to 
Proactive Interference  we selected the Cued Recall task, Simon task and Shape-Matching 
tasks. 
Page 46 of 89Psychonomic Bulletin & Review submission
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
However, initial data screening and confirmatory factor analyses showed that two of the 
chosen tasks (Simon and Cued Recall tasks) showed no relationship between any of the other 
tasks and low reliability respectively. We therefore had to exclude these tasks from further 
analyses, and follow an alternative analytical approach of using the remaining tasks as 
individual predictors. 
Specific predictions about potential relationships between the individual inhibitory predictors 
and the ToM tasks are as follows:
1.) The Director task involves the participant avoiding interference from their own 
perspective when integrating information about the director’s perspective with his 
instructions, and also the need to avoid selecting a distracting incorrect response 
(Barr, 2008). This leads to the expectation of a role for both Response-Distracter 
Inhibition and Resistance to Proactive Interference, and therefore potential 
relationships with any of the selected inhibition tasks.
2.) The L1-VPT Conflict index relates to interference between self/other perspectives, 
and literature suggests that participant errors and response times reflect the effect of 
self/other consistency on selection of a response (Apperly, 2010, Qureshi et al., 2010, 
McCleery et al., 2011). This suggests a functional role for Response-Distractor 
Inhibition, and so we predicted a relationship between L1-VPT Conflict index and 
inhibition tasks involving Response-Distractor Inhibition. The Focus index represents 
relative performance on judgments that relate to the self (versus other). As such, we 
did not expect to see a relationship with the Focus Index and inhibitory control tasks.
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Appendix A2
Task methodology (further details)
Shape-matching task
The shapes used were taken from DeSchepper and Treisman (1996); eight each of green 
(target), red (distracter) and white (matching) shapes. The task was simplified to measure 
resistance to distracters and resistance to inappropriate responses, rather than negative 
priming as in DeSchepper and Treisman (1996). This was done by presenting the distracter 
shapes at the same time as target shapes in the experimental trials, which requires participants 
to actively keep the distracters from interfering with processing of the target shapes (Endo, 
Saiki & Sato, 2001).
The shapes measured 135 x 124 pixels and were presented on the left (green/red shapes) and 
right (white shape) of a 300 x 300 pixel black square. The number of times each type of 
shape occurred was balanced across the task. Across the total of 112 trials (56 distracter trials 
and 56 no-distracter trials), the number of times each shape occurred was balanced in four 
separate blocks of 28 trials. Within these, the number of matching (green = white) and non-
matching (red = white) stimuli were also balanced. 
Participants were instructed to decide whether the green (target) shape matched the white 
shape. They were told to ignore the red (distracter) shape when it was present. Each trial had 
the following procedure: The participants were presented with a READY prompt, to which 
they had to respond to in order to proceed. A blank screen was then shown for 1100ms, 
followed by a fixation point for another 500ms. The shapes were then presented until the 
participant responded. Then another blank screen was shown for 100ms, upon which the 
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READY prompt appeared for the start of the next trial. Images of the trials are shown in 
Figure 1:
Figure 1. Trial images: Top left = no distracter, match; Top right = distracter, match; Bottom left = no distracter, no match; 
Bottom right = distracter, no match.
Cued Recall task
The task was designed to measure pro-active interference and was based on the study of 
Tolan and Tehan (1999). Participants were presented with either one block (filler trials) or 
two blocks (control and experimental trials) of four serially presented words (one per 
1000ms). In all trials this was followed by a numerical magnitude judgment task as a 
distraction1. Participants were then presented with a cue word to vocally recall a word from 
the only block for filler trials or from the second block (control and experimental trials). The 
1 Participants were presented with eight serially presented random numbers of two digits (one per 1000ms), and 
had to judge aloud if they were above or below 50.
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cue word was a category word related to the target word in the second block, but also to a foil 
word in the first block of experimental trials (there was no foil word in control trials). The 
foil words were always a more common instance of the category given by the cue word (than 
the target words), so increasing pro-active interference. An example experimental trial is 
shown in Figure 2.
Block 1 (read aloud):
   
Block 2 (read silently):
   
Distracter task
Cue:
Figure 2. Cued Recall experimental trial (for the purposes of illustration, the blue border indicates foil word, and the red border 
indicates target word; these borders were not present in experimental stimuli)
The experiment consisted of 10 one block filler trials and 40 two block trials, the latter 
consisting of 20 control and 20 experimental trials. To increase interference, the ALOUD 
block always came before the SILENT block. This was followed by the distracter task and 
then the cue word. The dependent measure was the number of correct control trials minus the 
number of correct interference trials. This was chosen because the number of correct control 
trials was taken to be the measure of the participants’ general recall ability (dealing with the 
interference caused by the mixed modality (reading aloud v silently), and the distracter task). 
The interference trials additionally had pro-active interference from the foil word in the first 
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block. The measure therefore assessed participants’ ability to deal with pro-active 
interference while taking into account their general recall ability.
Simon task
The task was based on Peterson et al. (2002). Participants were shown horizontally-orientated 
arrows (left or right), presented on the left or right of a central fixation point. Participants 
were instructed to respond according to the orientation of the arrows, not the position. As the 
arrow position is visually more salient than the arrow orientation, responding to the 
orientation requires the inhibition of any response to the position. The majority of trials were 
congruent for orientation and position (328 congruent, 82 incongruent)., with left and right 
positions and orientation balanced equally across four blocks of 102 trials for a total of 408 
trials.
Each trial began with a fixation point for 200ms, followed by an arrow for a maximum of 
1300ms or until a response was made. The difference between response times to accurate 
incongruent and congruent trials was taken to be a measure of any inhibitory processing cost 
present only in the incongruent trials (any processing cost common to the incongruent and 
congruent trials would be accounted for).
Go / No-Go task
The experiment consisted a total of 520 trials across eight blocks of 65 experimental trials 
(each block also had an additional five trials at the start (these were eliminated in analyses as 
practice trials). There were either eight or ten no go (K) trials (and a corresponding 57 or 55 
go trials) in each block Each letter was presented centrally on a black screen. 
Participants viewed a series of letters presented on a computer screen to which they had to 
respond by pressing the spacebar, except for the letter ‘K’. If the participant responded 
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incorrectly to the letter K, a tone would be heard for 250ms. Each trial consisted of an initial 
fixation cross for 250ms, followed by a letter. Each letter remained on-screen for 500ms, or 
until the participant responded. 
Go / No-Go (picture task)
This task was based on the study of Schmitt et al. (2000). Participants were presented with 
images of either birds or mammals (there was a familiarisation procedure prior to the task2). 
Participants responded by pressing the Q key if a bird was shown, and with a P if the image 
was of a mammal. If the name of either began with a vowel, they were instructed not to 
respond. This task creates a Go/No-Go situation because an initial Go decision is based on 
the rapidly-available semantic information (bird/mammal category) which must then be 
cancelled or allowed based on later-available phonological or orthographic information, (van 
Turrenout et al., 1997). The majority of images were go trials (36 each for birds and 
mammals, compared to 9 no-go trials for each), repeated twice and balanced across eight 
blocks for a total of 180 trials. The first three trials were removed from further analyses as 
practice trials.
During the experiment, after an initial fixation cross for 250ms, the images were presented 
for 750ms, or until the participant responded. If the participant responded incorrectly, a tone 
was heard for 250ms. The images were scaled to 500 x 500 pixels.
2 The participants were shown (serially) all the images of birds and mammals, together with their names, at the 
start of the experiment (each image remained on-screen until the participant pressed a key). They were then 
shown the images again, in a different order, for 3000ms, in which time they were instructed to name each 
image. Pilot work had already shown people were familiar with the mammals and birds used.
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Stop-signal task
A total of 256 trials across eight blocks were presented to participants, consisting of either a 
“X” or “O”. After an initial fixation cross for 500ms, the stimuli were shown on-screen for 
1000ms or until the participant responded, followed by a blank screen for 2000ms (or again 
until the participant responded). 64 of the trials were stop trials, where a tone was heard after 
a variable delay, with the remaining being go trials, all balanced across blocks. Participants 
were instructed not to respond if they heard the tone, and the stop signal delay started at 
250ms after stimuli presentation and then followed a dynamic tracking procedure (+50ms if 
they responded correctly, and -50ms if incorrectly). Letters were presented centrally on a 400 
x 300 pixel black screen.
L1-VPT task
There were a total of 96 matching trials: 48 trials in which participants were asked to verify 
their own perspective (with 24 consistent perspective trials and 24 inconsistent perspective 
trials) and 48 trials in which participants were asked verify the avatar’s perspective (with 24 
consistent perspective trials and 24 inconsistent perspective trials). In addition to these 96 test 
trials, 96 mismatching filler trials were included (with the same distribution as for test trials) 
as well as 16 additional anti-strategy filler trials (eight matching and eight mismatching in 
which no circles were pinned on the wall). The 208 items were split into four blocks of 52 
items. Each trial image measured 640 x 480 pixels, with the avatar presented centrally. 
Between zero and three dots were presented at the avatar’s eye level on neither, both or either 
wall.
Before being shown the image, participants were cued with a verbal perspective description 
that informed them which perspective to take (“you” versus “he”/”she”) and which 
perspective content to verify (i.e., a number of dots visible, between zero and three). They 
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were then asked to decide whether the cue information matched the relevant content shown in 
the image. In half of the trials, the cue matched the image and on the other half the cue did 
not match the image. An initial fixation cross was on-screen for 750ms, followed by the cues, 
which were also shown for 750ms. The gap in between fixation and cues was 500ms. The 
stimuli picture remained on-screen until the participant responded. If no response was 
received within 2000ms of the picture being on-screen, the trial was recorded as no response. 
Trial conditions are shown in Figure 24:
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Perspective 
Consistency
Perspective Correct 
Response
Self Other
Consistent
Consistent
”Yes”
“No”
Inconsistent
Inconsistent
“Yes”
“No”
Figure 23. L1 VPT trial conditions
Director task
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Stimuli replicated those in Apperly et al. (2010). A total of 32 different grid arrays were used, 
each with 16 slots (4 x 4 grid). In each grid, 5 slots were occluded from the view of the 
director (male figure with a male voice), with the remaining 11 visible to the participant and 
the director. These were arranged in one of four different patterns, sized at 720 x 540 pixels. 
Each grid contained eight items, created from simple cartoon images. There were128 
instructions used across the experiment, with between three and five for each grid. Two 
practice grids were also used with the same layout.
Sixteen of the grids were ‘experimental’ grids, with one critical instruction that could refer to 
an object in an occluded slot (if only the participant’s perspective was taken into account), or 
to one in a mutually visible slot (if the director’s perspective was accounted for). The position 
of this critical instruction varied between first and fourth in the series for each grid. Half of 
the experimental grids were ‘relational’ trials, and half were ‘ambiguous’ trials. Relational 
instructions followed the pattern “Move the [adjective noun] one slot left/right/up/down”, and 
the noun occurred on average 1,047ms after the start of the instructions. For ambiguous trials, 
the instructions followed the formula “Move the [noun] one slot left/right/up/down”, and the 
noun occurred on average 742ms after the instruction. All other instructions were filler items 
that followed the same pattern of the critical instruction, and always referred to mutually 
visible objects.
The remaining 16 grids were matched control grids (also half relational and ambiguous), 
where the item referred to in the critical trial was replaced with an item that could not be a 
potential referent (e.g. aeroplane for small ball). Every grid was presented for 5000ms before 
instructions began, and these were then given at 5000ms intervals. An example grid is shown 
in Figure 34.
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Competitor item: golf ball (experimental grid) Control item (control grid)
Target item (tennis ball)
Figure 4. Example grid for a relational grid of the Keysar task
Critical instruction: Move the small ball down one slot
In the experimental grid, the smallest ball from the participant’s viewpoint is the competitor item (golf ball), but 
the target item (the smallest ball from the director’s viewpoint) is the tennis ball.
In the control grid, the smallest ball from the participant viewpoint is the target item (tennis ball), which is the 
same as for the director.
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Appendix A3
Individual task results
The data screening process consisted of several steps. The following steps were adapted from 
those used by Friedman and Miyake (2004) and Oberauer (2005) in order to reduce the effect 
of any extreme response time values on the mean.
The critical dependent variables of the various tasks were calculated, and any values more 
than three standard deviations above or below the task mean were replaced by the cut-off 
value (of three standard deviations above or below the mean)3. All pairwise plots were then 
examined for nonlinearity and heteroscedasticity. The distributions of the critical dependent 
variables were then checked, as were univariate outliers, and any transformations were 
carried out. Checks for multivariate outliers were then done, and finally the variance of each 
variable was examined and modified as per Kline (2005). Each task required different 
calculations for its critical dependent variable, which are all detailed below. The reliability of 
all the critical measures was calculated by adjusting split-half correlations using the 
Spearman-Brown prophecy formula (Salthouse et al., 2006). Each task was first analysed 
individually to establish that the expected effects were observed.
Go/No-Go
The data were analysed using a 2-way (position; start v end) repeated measures ANOVA. 
The dependent variable was the False Alarm Rate (FAR) on No-Go trials.
3 For the L1 VPT we followed the procedure of Samson et al. (2010) and used 2.5 SD rather than 3SD).
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There was no difference in the performance of participants in the task carried out at the start 
of the session and the performance in the task carried out at the end of the session (see Figure 
A1; F (1, 141) = .35, p = .55, ηp2 = 0.02), so FAR was collapsed over position. FAR was 
significantly different from zero (t (141) = 23.53, p < .01).
1
Session
2
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
FA
R
Figure A1. FAR by session (bars = standard deviation)
As the distribution was skewed, a square-root transformation was carried out. The reliability 
of the measure was excellent (.93).
Go / No-Go (picture)
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted, with image type (bird v mammal) as the 
condition, and FAR as the dependent variable. There was a main effect of image, with higher 
FAR for bird images than for mammals (F (1, 141) = 9.67, p < .01, ηp2 = .07; see Figure A2). 
However, due to the correlation between the FARs for birds and mammals suggesting similar 
processes were involved, they were collapsed to form a single FAR measure. The reliability 
of the measure was satisfactory (.74).
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Bird
Image
Mammal
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
FA
R
Figure A2. FAR by image (bars = standard deviations)
Stop-signal task
The critical dependent variable was the mean response time to the go trials (correct response 
only) minus the mean response time to the stop trials. The mean stop signal response time 
(SSRT) values of the participants was similar to that found in previous literature (232ms (SD 
= 237.09) compared with 189ms in Aron et al. (2003)). 
The distribution of SSRT was extremely non-normal. In order to normalise the distribution 
the times above three standard deviations were replaced by the highest value below three 
standard deviations plus one (for the lowest above three standard deviations, plus two for the 
second lowest, etc.). This was done as described above in three waves – twice for values 
above three standard deviations, and once for values below three standard deviations, with 
two participant values being replaced (the mean SSRT after this trimming was 219ms (SD = 
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172.41)). These procedures are as described in Tabachnick and Fidell (2001). This resulted in 
the distribution being reasonably normal. The reliability was excellent (.99).
Shape-Matching Task
Data were trimmed by condition for each participant individually, looking at correct 
responses only (5.1% of the responses were incorrect). Response time values that were more 
than three standard deviations away from the condition mean for a participant were replaced 
by the cut-off value (of three standard deviations from the condition mean). This was done 
for 1.41% of trials. A 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA was used to examine the data. The 
factors were distracter (present v not present) and match (did the target match the green 
shape, yes v no) and the measure was the mean response time for each condition.
There was an effect of distracter (F (1, 141) = 122.73, p <.01, ηp2 = .47). If the distracter shape 
was present, the response time was significantly longer than when the distracter shape was 
not present (distracter = 1296.10ms > no distracter = 973.07ms). There was also an effect of 
match (F (1, 141) = 25.13, p < .01, ηp2 = .15). Participants took significantly longer to respond 
to trials in which the green shape did not match the white shape than to trials where they did 
not (match = 1093.12ms < no match = 1176.05ms). There was an interaction between 
distraction and matching (F (1, 141) = 4.65, p < .05, ηp2 = .03), as can be noted in Figure A3. 
Errors were similar for all conditions (proportion of errors in distracter no match condition = 
.07, in distracter match condition = .05, in no distracter no match condition = .04, in no 
distracter match condition = .04), indicating that there was no particular trade-off between 
speed and accuracy.
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Figure A3. Response time by condition (bars = standard deviations)
Simple main effects showed that for both match and mismatch conditions, participants took 
significantly longer to respond to trials where the distracter was present (p’s < .01). When the 
distracter was present, there was no difference between the match and mismatch conditions (p 
= .08), but participants took longer to respond to the mismatch condition when the distracter 
was not present (p < .01).
The critical dependent variable was the difference in mean response time between the 
distracter no-match condition and the no distracter match condition. The distracter no-match 
condition appeared to have the largest amount of interference from the distracter shape, as 
this shape matched the target. The no distracter match condition had the least amount of 
interference, and gives a baseline measure of the response time to the simple matching 
process. The difference between these conditions is therefore a measure of the interference 
caused by the distracter shape only, which should require inhibitory control. Any values more 
than three standard deviations away from the mean were replaced by the cut-off value (of 
three standard deviations above or below the mean). The distribution of the critical shape 
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matching task dependent variable was extremely non-normal, so underwent a log 10 
transformation resulting in a normal distribution. Reliability was adequate (.66).
Cued Recall
As the data analysed for the cued recall task were the number of correct trials, they were not 
trimmed (9.5% of the responses were incorrect). Control and interference trial performance 
was analysed, using a 2-way repeated measures ANOVA. In both trial types participants were 
cued to recall a target word from a list (the second of two). In interference trial a foil word 
was also present (in the first list of the two). The first list of words was always read aloud, 
and the second set was always read silently. Before the analysis was carried out, missing 
values for two participants4 on task were estimated through imputation and regression 
estimation procedures. The result of the estimations from these two procedures did not differ 
significantly, so the estimates from the imputation method using the program NORM 
(Schafer, 1999) were used.
Participants were more accurate in the control condition than in the interference condition (F 
(1, 141) = 191.38, p < .01, ηp2 = .59; see Figure A4). This effect is probably due to the effect of 
the foil word in the interference trials affecting recall of the target word, as expected. The 
critical dependent variable was calculated as the difference between the number of correct 
control trials and the number of correct interference trials. The mixed modality of the 
presentation and distracter task were common to both trials, so this dependent variable should 
remove any contribution from that. The dependent variable should therefore only measure the 
level of interference caused by the foil word in recalling the target word, interference which 
4 These participants failed to complete the cued recall task due to time constraints (arrived late to session).
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should be mediated by inhibitory control. The distribution of the critical dependent measure 
was normal, so no transformations were required. However, the reliability of the measure was 
extremely low (.12), so this measure was excluded from the final analyses. 
Control Interference
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Er
ro
rs
 (N
)
Figure A4. Errors (N; bars = standard deviation)
Simon task
The data were trimmed by condition for each participant for correct responses only (5.3% 
were incorrect responses). Response time values that were more than three standard 
deviations away from the condition mean for a participant were replaced by the cut-off value 
(of three standard deviations from the condition mean). A 2 (position; left x right) x 2 
(orientation; left x right) repeated-measures ANOVA was used to examine the data, with the 
dependent variable mean response time for correct trials. 
There was no effect of the position of the arrow on the response time of participants (F (1, 152) 
= .77, p = .38, ηp2 = .01), whilst there was a significant effect of orientation (F (1, 152) = 36.34, 
p ≤ .01, ηp2 = .19), with responses to left-orientated arrows significantly slower than to right-
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orientated arrows. This may be due to the majority of the sample being right-handed 
participants. 
There was a significant interaction between position and orientation (F (1, 152) = 567.16, p ≤ 
.01, ηp2 = .79), as shown in Figure . Simple main effects were conducted to analyse this 
further.
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Figure A5: Mean response times (and standard error) to differing positions and orientations of arrow 
Simple main effects indicated that when the orientation and position of the arrow was 
congruent, response times were significantly faster, relative to when they were incongruent 
(all p’s < .01). The pattern of errors showed a similar effect, with more errors made when 
position and orientation were incongruent (.13) compared to when they were congruent (.35), 
indicating no speed – accuracy trade-off.
The critical dependent variable of the Simon task was the difference between the mean 
response times to incongruent stimuli and congruent stimuli. The reliability of this measure 
was satisfactory (.92). This was taken to measure the interference between the dominant 
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response and correct response to the incongruent stimuli, interference that should require 
inhibitory control to resolve. The distribution was examined, was found to be skewed, so was 
square root transformed, resulting in a normal distribution.
Theory of Mind tasks
L1 VPT
Data trimming was conducted on correct responses only on the matching trials (4.78% of the 
data were incorrect responses). Response times that were 2.5 standard deviations away from 
the mean were eliminated (2.04% of the data; in line with Qureshi et al., 2010) and so were 
response omissions due to the timeout procedure (responses over 2000ms; 0.47% of the data) 
for a total of 3.92% of all trials. The data were analysed using a 2 x 2 repeated-measures 
ANOVA, with consistency (consistent v inconsistent) and perspective (self v other) as the 
factors. The measure first investigated was response time in each of the conditions.
There was a main effect of consistency (F (1, 141) = 288.59, p < .01, ηp2 = 0.67), with the 
response time in the inconsistent condition significantly higher than that in the consistent 
condition. There was no effect of perspective (F (1, 141) = .85, p = .36, ηp2 =.01). There was a 
significant interaction between consistency and perspective (F (1, 141) = 63.52, p < .01, ηp2 = 
0.31; see Figure A6) that was analysed further using simple main effects.
For both other and self-perspective judgments, response times to inconsistent trials were 
significantly longer than for consistent trials (p’s < .01). For consistent trials, self-perspective 
judgements were significantly longer than other perspective judgement trials (p < .01), 
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whereas for inconsistent trials, other perspective judgements were significantly longer than 
self-perspective judgements (p < .01)
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Figure A6: Response times (bars = standard deviation) by condition and trial
The errors (not trimmed) in each condition were examined using an identical 2 x 2 repeated 
measures ANOVA. There was a main effect of consistency (F (1, 141) = 176.31, p < .01, ηp2 = 
.56), with more errors in the inconsistent condition than in the consistent condition. There 
was again no effect of perspective (F (1, 141) = 1.09, p =.30, ηp2 = .01). There was a significant 
interaction between consistency and perspective (F (1, 141) = 14.46, p < .01, ηp2 = .09), 
investigated further using simple main effects (see Figure A7).
For both other and self-perspective judgments, there were more errors on inconsistent trials 
than on consistent trials (p’s < .01). For consistent trials, there were more errors for self-
perspective judgements than for other perspective judgement trials (p < .01), whereas for 
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inconsistent trials, there were more errors for other perspective judgements than for self-
perspective judgements (p < .05)
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Figure A7: Visual perspective error proportions (bars = standard deviation) by condition and trial
There was no difference in either response time or error rate between the participants taking 
their own perspective (self condition) or taking the avatar’s perspective (other condition), 
indicating that in general there was no difficulty in taking one perspective over another. Other 
perspective trials show higher response times and error rates than self perspective trials, 
possibly due to greater interference of the self perspective in the inconsistent trials only. 
This suggests that the L1 VPT was showing similar patterns to the original study of Samson 
et al. (2010). 
The critical dependent variables for the task were calculated as per Bukowski & Samson 
(2017), resulting in a Conflict Index (inconsistent – consistent perspectives) and a Focus 
Index (self-perspective – other perspective), using Inverse Efficiency Scores (IES; response 
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time / 1 – error rate)5. A higher value in the Conflict index indicated greater difficulty in 
handling conflicting perspectives, while positive values in the Focus index indicated better 
performance in taking the other person’s perspective than the self- perspective (more 
altercentric rather than egocentric). Results showed that the mean Conflict Index for 
participants was .21 (SD = .13), with an excellent reliability of .85, and the mean Focus Index 
was -.004 (SD = .13), with again an excellent reliability of .88. The variances were adjusted 
to within a 10:1 ratio of the other task measures (Kline, 2005). 
Director Task
For the response time analyses, the data were trimmed by condition for each participant 
individually, looking at correct responses only (12.5% were incorrect responses to the 
competitor item, 1.4% were responses to another object). Response time values that were 
more than three standard deviations away from the condition mean for a participant were 
replaced by the cut-off value (of three standard deviations from the condition mean). This 
was done for 0.48% of trials. The data were analysed using a 2 x 2 repeated measures 
ANOVA, trial type (control v experimental) and condition (ambiguous v relational). 
Response time was looked at first, with correct responses only used. There was no effect of 
trial type (F (1, 141) = .12, p = .73, ηp2 = .00). There was an effect of condition (F (1, 141) = 
187.23, p < .01, ηp2 = .59), with the response time to ambiguous trials being significantly 
faster than to relational trials (see Figure A8). There was also a marginal significant 
5 Use of IES is not recommended if speed-accuracy trade-offs are shown (indicated by no positive correlation 
between response times and error rates) and if the average error rate is above .10 (c.f. Bukowski & Samson, 
2017). The correlation between response time and error rate was positive (r (142) = .20, p < .01), and the mean 
error rate across conditions was 0.06 (standard deviation = 0.07), meaning both recommendations for using IES 
were met.
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interaction between trial type and condition (F (1, 141) = 3.71, p = 0.06, ηp2 = .02). These 
findings, compared against the error findings described below, show no indication of a speed-
accuracy trade-off.
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Figure A8. Mean response times (and standard error) in Director task by condition and trial type
 
The error rate was then examined with a series of t-tests, as no errors made in the control 
conditions (error data were not trimmed). A one-sample t-test (with a theoretical value of 
zero) showed that significantly more errors than zero were made in the experimental 
condition (t (141) =12.89, p < .01, with a mean difference of 3.94 (SD = 3.59)). A paired-
sample t-test showed there was also an effect of condition in the experimental trials (t (141) = 
-8.88, p < .01), with significantly more errors in the relational condition than in the 
ambiguous condition.
 
For the ambiguous trials there were significantly more errors than zero (t (141) = 11.36, p < 
.01, with a mean difference of 1.17 (SD = 1.21)). There were significantly more errors than 
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zero in the relational trials (t (141) = 12.12, p < .01, with a mean difference of 2.77 (SD = 
2.68)). These differences can be seen in Figure A9.
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Figure A9: Mean number of errors (and standard error) in Director task by condition and trial type
The control condition was expected to have no errors and a faster response time due to there 
being no competing item for the item description given by the instructor. The relational trials 
were slower and resulted in more errors than the ambiguous trials. This may be due to there 
being more items that the participant is cued to in the relational trials (for example in the 
experimental grid where the critical instruction is ‘move the small ball…’, there are three 
different sized balls present) compared to in the ambiguous trials (where in an experimental 
grid, where the critical instruction is ‘move the mouse…’, there is a computer mouse and a 
mouse, so there are only two potential items). The additional item that the participant must 
consider in relational trials may explain the increased response times, and perhaps the 
increased error rate.
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The critical dependent variables for the Director task were the error rates of the relational and 
ambiguous trials. These were expected to measure the participants’ failure to use their theory 
of mind. Both the distributions of the dependent variables were skewed, and they were both 
square root transformed (ambiguous with a constant of one to remove negative values). This 
resulted in adequately normal distributions for both dependent variables. The reliability of the 
ambiguous measure was borderline satisfactory (.59), though the reliability of the relational 
measure was excellent (.83).
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Appendix A4
Executive task discussion
An initial correlation matrix including the Simon task is shown in Table 1. There were no 
correlations between the Simon task and any other task, so this was dropped from the final 
analyses.
Table 1. Correlation matrix between variables
 Simon task
Shape 
Matching
Go 
NoGo
Go 
NoGo 
(picture)
Stop-
Signal
Director 
Task 
(ambiguous)
Director 
Task 
(relational)
Visual 
Perspective 
(Conflict)
Shape-
Matching .07
Go NoGo .11 -.04 -
Go NoGo 
(picture) .03 .00 .23** -
Stop-Signal .14 .15 .18* .08 -
Director 
(ambiguous) -.09 .09 .00 .34** .02 -
Director 
(relational) .04 .29** .01 .25** .05 .65** -
Visual 
Perspective 
(Conflict)
.12 .06 .14 .00 .24** -.03 -.04 -
Visual 
Perspective 
(Focus)
.07 -.02 .08 -.04 .02 .02 -.03 -.18*
Final Rresults from the path analyses showed a correlation between the Go / No-Go (picture) 
and Go / No-Go tasks, and between the Go / No-Go (picture) and the SST. There were no 
correlations with the Shape-matching task. While we predicted that the executive tasks would 
all intercorrelate as they all require response-distracter inhibition (as per Friedman & Miyake, 
2004), the specific nature of the inhibition required by these varying tasks may explain this 
pattern of correlations. The Go / No-Go tasks both involve selecting relevant responses (i.e., 
to respond (go) or not (no-go) to the stimuli). Likewise the SST involves selecting the 
appropriate response to a given stimuli (whether to respond (go) or inhibit their response 
(stop) depending on whether there is a stop-signal). On the other hand, the Shape-matching 
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task involves selection of relevant and ignoring of irrelevant information, whereby the 
participant needs to ignore the distracter shape and select their response based on the relevant 
target shape. This may explain why responses on shape matching were not related with the 
other executive measures. 
The nature of the ToM tasks may also explain the relationships found with the different 
executive tasks. As noted, L1 VPT performance, particularly on the Conflict index, may be 
related to the effect of self/other consistency on selection of a response (Apperly, 2010; 
Qureshi et al., 2010; McCleery et al., 2011), rather than on selection of information or any 
integration. As such it is perhaps unsurprising that Conflict index of the L1 VPT is only 
related to the SST. However, the Director task requires integration of perspective and 
instruction, which may involve selection of relevant information and also response selection. 
This perspective would explain the relationship between to the Go / No-Go (picture) and 
Shape-matching task. The latter may be related to Relational trials of the Director task due to 
there being potentially three referent objects (rather than two as in ambiguous trials).
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Appendix B (models prior to final)
Initial Model
The initial model shown in Figure 1 showed no relationship between the Go / No-Go or Stop-
Signal tasks and either of the Director task variables. The Shape-Matching task only 
predicted performance on the relational variable of the Director task. The Go / No-Go 
(picture) task predicted performance on both variables of the Director task. The Stop-Signal 
Task predicted performance on the L1 VPT Conflict Index. All parameters (standardised and 
unstandardized path coefficients, covariances and correlations, variances and squared 
multiple correlations) are shown in Table 1.
Figure 1. Initial Model (standardised coefficients)
Table 1. Parameter estimates for initial model
Path Unstandardised Estimate 
(Standard Error)
Standardised Estimate
Shape-matching →Director 
(relational)
.16 (.04) .29***
Go/No-Go → Director (relational) -.05 (.10) -.04
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Go/No-Go (picture) → Director 
(relational)
.23 (.07) .26***
SST → Director (relational) -.00 (.03) -.01
Shape-matching →Director 
(ambiguous)
.04 (.04) .09
Go/No-Go → Director 
(ambiguous)
-.09 (.09) -.08
Go/No-Go (picture) → Director 
(ambiguous)
.28 (.06) .35***
SST → Director (ambiguous) -.00 (.03) -.00
Shape-matching →L1 VPT 
(Focus)
-.01 (.04) -.02
Go/No-Go → L1 VPT (Focus) .09 (.08) .09
Go/No-Go (picture) → L1 VPT 
(Focus)
-.04 (.06) -.06
SST → L1 VPT (Focus) .00 (.03) .01
Shape-matching → L1 VPT 
(Conflict)
.02 (.04) .03
Go/No-Go → L1 VPT (Conflict) .12 (.09) .12
Go/No-Go (picture) → L1 VPT 
(Conflict)
-.03 (.06) -.05
SST → L1 VPT (Conflict) .07 (.03) .22**
Covariances Unstandardised Estimate 
(Standard Error)
Standardised Estimate
Director (relational) ↔ Director 
(ambiguous)
3.42 (.54) .63***
L1 VPT (Conflict) ↔L1 VPT 
(Focus)
-.93 (.39) -.21*
Variances Estimate (Standard Error)
Shape-Matching 23.60 (2.81)***
Go/No-Go 4.48 (.53)***
Go/No-Go (picture) 9.22 (1.10)***
SST 45.20 (5.38)***
e1 (Director (relational)) 5.96 (.71)***
e2 (Director (ambiguous)) 5.02 (.60) ***
e3 (L1 VPT (Conflict)) 4.47 (.53)***
e4 (L1 VPT (Focus)) 4.66 (.56)***
Squared Multiple Correlations
Director (relational) .16
Director (ambiguous) .14
L1 VPT (Conflict) .07
L1 VPT (Focus) .01
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
Table 1 shows significant correlations between the pairs of variables for each ToM task, and 
that the error terms and variances were all significant. Approximately 16% of the relational 
variable and 14% of the ambiguous variable were accounted for by this initial model. The 
model (Error! Reference source not found.) however, was not a good fit to the actual data.
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Model 2
Non-significant paths were removed, resulting in the model shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Model 2 (standardised coefficients)
Table 2 shows the model parameters in full. Removing the non-significant parameters did not 
affect the individual parameters or the model fit (Error! Reference source not found.), with 
the AIC value reducing from the initial model.
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Table 2. Parameter estimates for Model 2
Path Unstandardised Estimate (Standard Error) Standardised Estimate
Shape-matching →Director 
(relational) .13 (.03) .24***
Go/No-Go → Director (relational)
Go/No-Go (picture) → Director 
(relational) .22 (.07) .26***
SST → Director (relational)
Shape-matching →Director 
(ambiguous)
Go/No-Go → Director 
(ambiguous)
Go/No-Go (picture) → Director 
(ambiguous) .26 (.06) .34***
SST → Director (ambiguous)
Shape-matching →L1 VPT 
(Focus)
Go/No-Go → L1 VPT (Focus)
Go/No-Go (picture) → L1 VPT 
(Focus)
SST → L1 VPT (Focus)
Shape-matching → L1 VPT 
(Conflict)
Go/No-Go → L1 VPT (Conflict)
Go/No-Go (picture) → L1 VPT 
(Conflict)
SST → L1 VPT (Conflict) .08 (.03) .25**
Covariances Unstandardised Estimate (Standard Error) Standardised Estimate
Director (relational) ↔ Director 
(ambiguous) 3.54 (.56) .63***
L1 VPT (Conflict) ↔L1 VPT 
(Focus) -.89 (.40) -.19*
Variances Estimate (Standard Error)
Shape-Matching 23.60 (2.81)***
Go/No-Go 4.48 (.53)***
Go/No-Go (picture) 9.22 (1.10)***
SST 45.20 (5.38)***
e1 (Director (relational)) 5.99 (.71)***
e2 (Director (ambiguous)) 5.10 (.61)***
e3 (L1 VPT (Conflict)) 4.51 (.54)***
e4 (L1 VPT (Focus)) 4.73 (.56)***
Squared Multiple Correlations
Director (relational) .12
Director (ambiguous) .11
L1 VPT (Conflict) .06
L1 VPT (Focus) .00
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Appendix C (all models)
The following analyses used interference measures for self (altercentric interference from the 
avatar perspective) and other (egocentric interference from the self perspective) for the L1 
VPT task. These were calculated based on reaction times for correct trials only and were 
“inconsistent perspective condition – consistent condition” for self and other trials separately.
After variance adjustment and transformations, the final descriptive statistics for the 
dependent and independent variables were as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Final task descriptives
Measure M (SD) Variance Reliability1
Shape-Matching (ms) (square root transformation) 21.56 (4.88) 23.77 .92
Go / No Go (FAR) 4.28 (2.12) 4.51 .93
Go / No Go (picture) (FAR; Bird/Mammal)2 6.17 (3.05) 9.28 .74
Stop-Signal (SSRT) (log 10 transformation) 16.33 (6.74) 45.52 .99
Director Task (errors) (log 10 transformation)
   Ambiguous
   Relational
2.34 (2.41)
2.75 (2.66)
5.79
7.07
.59
.83
Visual Perspective measures (ms)
Egocentric interference
Altercentric interference
4.88 (5.62)
8.52 (6.33)
31.63
40.08
.63
.43
An initial correlation matrix between the variables is shown in 
Table 2. For the inhibitory control tasks, positive correlations were shown between the Shape-
Matching and Stop-Signal tasks, the Go/No-Go and Go/No-Go (picture) tasks and the 
Go/No-Go and Stop-Signal tasks. A positive correlation was shown between the Director task 
variables, and a negative one between the L1 VPT variables. The Shape-Matching task had 
1 Split-half reliabilities
2 As FAR for the bird and mammal trials were significantly correlated and followed the same pattern, they were 
collapsed to form a single FAR for the go / no go (picture) task
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positive correlations with both the Director (relational) variable, while the Go/No-Go 
(picture) task had positive correlations with both measures of the Director task. The Stop-
Signal task also had a positive correlation with the L1 VPT (Conflict) variable.
Table 2. Correlation matrix between variables
 Shape Matching
Go 
NoGo
Go 
NoGo 
(picture)
Stop-
Signal
Director 
Task 
(ambiguous)
Director 
Task 
(relational)
Visual 
Perspective 
(Conflict)
Go NoGo -.04 -
Go NoGo 
(picture) .00 .23** -
Stop-Signal .15 .18* .08 -
Director 
(ambiguous) .09 .00 .34** .02 -
Director 
(relational) .29** .01 .25** .05 .65** -
Visual 
Perspective 
(Egocentric)
.19* .10 .04 .24** .05 .08 -
Visual 
Perspective 
Altercentric
.16 .03 .01 .14 -.12 -.07 .24**
* p < .05, ** p < .01
Models
Analyses were carried out using AMOS 25. 
Initial Model
The initial model shown in Figure 1 showed no relationship between the Go / No-Go or Stop-
Signal tasks and either of the Director task variables. The Shape-Matching task predicted 
performance on the relational variable of the Director task. The Go / No-Go (picture) task 
predicted performance on both variables of the Director task. The Stop-Signal Task and 
Shape-Matching task predicted performance egocentric interference. All parameters 
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(standardised and unstandardized path coefficients, covariances and correlations, variances 
and squared multiple correlations) are shown in Table 1.
Figure 1. Initial Model (standardised coefficients)
Table 3. Parameter estimates for initial model
Path Unstandardised Estimate 
(Standard Error)
Standardised Estimate
Shape-matching →Director 
(relational)
.16 (.04) .29***
Go/No-Go → Director (relational) -.05 (.10) -.04
Go/No-Go (picture) → Director 
(relational)
.23 (.07) .26***
SST → Director (relational) -.00 (.03) -.01
Shape-matching →Director 
(ambiguous)
.04 (.04) .09
Go/No-Go → Director 
(ambiguous)
-.09 (.09) -.08
Go/No-Go (picture) → Director 
(ambiguous)
.28 (.06) .35***
SST → Director (ambiguous) -.00 (.03) -.00
Shape-matching →L1 VPT 
(Altercentric interference)
.17 (.10) .15
Go/No-Go → L1 VPT 
(Altercentric interference)
.04 (.22) .01
Go/No-Go (picture) → L1 VPT 
(Altercentric interference)
.00 (.15) .00
SST → L1 VPT (Altercentric 
interference)
.10 (.07) .12
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Shape-matching → L1 VPT 
(Egocentric interference)
.21 (.11) .16*
Go/No-Go → L1 VPT (Egocentric 
interference)
.20 (.24) .07
Go/No-Go (picture) → L1 VPT 
(Egocentric interference)
.02 (.17) .01
SST → L1 VPT (Egocentric 
interference)
.19 (.08) .20*
Covariances Unstandardised Estimate 
(Standard Error)
Standardised Estimate
Director (relational) ↔ Director 
(ambiguous)
3.42 (.54) .63***
L1 VPT (Egocentric interference) 
↔L1 VPT (Altercentric 
interference)
6.57 (.2.84) .20*
Variances Estimate (Standard Error)
Shape-Matching 23.60 (2.81)***
Go/No-Go 4.48 (.53)***
Go/No-Go (picture) 9.22 (1.10)***
SST 45.20 (5.38)***
e1 (Director (relational)) 5.96 (.71)***
e2 (Director (ambiguous)) 5.02 (.60) ***
e3 (L1 VPT (Egocentric 
interference))
30.11 (3.59)***
e4 (L1 VPT (Altercentric 
interference))
36.43 (4.34)***
Squared Multiple Correlations
Director (relational) .16
Director (ambiguous) .14
L1 VPT (Egocentric interference) .07
L1 VPT (Altercentric 
interference)
.04
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
Table 3 shows significant correlations between the pairs of variables for each ToM task, and 
that the error terms and variances were all significant. Approximately 16% of the relational 
variable and 14% of the ambiguous variable were accounted for by this initial model. The 
model (see Table 6) however, was not a good fit to the actual data.
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Model 2
Non-significant paths were removed, resulting in the model shown in Figure 2. Doing this did 
not significantly affect the model fit (Χ2 (11) = 8.85, p = .64).  
Figure 2. Model 2 (standardised coefficients)
Table 2 shows the model parameters in full. Removing the non-significant parameters did not 
affect the individual parameters or the model fit (Table 6), with the AIC value reducing from 
the initial model.
Table 4. Parameter estimates for Model 2
Path Unstandardised Estimate (Standard Error) Standardised Estimate
Shape-matching →Director 
(relational) .13 (.03) .24***
Go/No-Go → Director (relational)
Go/No-Go (picture) → Director 
(relational) .22 (.07) .26***
SST → Director (relational)
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Shape-matching →Director 
(ambiguous)
Go/No-Go → Director 
(ambiguous)
Go/No-Go (picture) → Director 
(ambiguous) .26 (.06) .34***
SST → Director (ambiguous)
Shape-matching →L1 VPT 
(Altercentric interference)
Go/No-Go → L1 VPT 
(Altercentric interference)
Go/No-Go (picture) → L1 VPT 
(Altercentric interference)
SST → L1 VPT (Altercentric 
interference)
Shape-matching → L1 VPT 
(Egocentric interference)
.16 (.10) .13
Go/No-Go → L1 VPT (Egocentric 
interference)
Go/No-Go (picture) → L1 VPT 
(Egocentric interference)
SST → L1 VPT (Egocentric 
interference)
.18 (.07) .19*
Covariances Unstandardised Estimate (Standard Error) Standardised Estimate
Director (relational) ↔ Director 
(ambiguous) 3.47 (.55) .63***
L1 VPT (Egocentric interference) 
↔L1 VPT (Altercentric 
interference)
6.89 (2.92) .20*
Variances Estimate (Standard Error)
Shape-Matching 23.60 (2.81)***
Go/No-Go 4.48 (.53)***
Go/No-Go (picture) 9.22 (1.10)***
SST 45.20 (5.38)***
e1 (Director (relational)) 5.99 (.71)***
e2 (Director (ambiguous)) 5.10 (.61)***
e3 (L1 VPT (Egocentric 
interference))
31.40 (3.74)***
e4 (L1 VPT (Altercentric 
interference))
36.68 (4.37)***
Squared Multiple Correlations
Director (relational) .12
Director (ambiguous) .11
L1 VPT (Egocentric interference) .05
L1 VPT (Altercentric interference) .00
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Model 3 (Final)
The non-significant path between the Shape-Matching task and egocentric interference was 
removed, and correlations added between the Go / No-Go (picture) and Go / No-Go tasks and 
also between the Go / No-Go and Stop-Signal tasks (as per modification indices), resulting in 
the final model in Figure 3. The model fit (as per AIC values) was improved.
Figure 3. Final model (standardised coefficients)
Table 5 shows the model parameters in full.
Table 5. Parameter estimates for Model 3 (Final)
Path Unstandardised Estimate (Standard Error) Standardised Estimate
Shape-matching →Director 
(relational) .13 (.03) .24***
Go/No-Go → Director (relational)
Go/No-Go (picture) → Director 
(relational) .22 (.07) .26***
SST → Director (relational)
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Shape-matching →Director 
(ambiguous)
Go/No-Go → Director 
(ambiguous)
Go/No-Go (picture) → Director 
(ambiguous) .26 (.06) .34***
SST → Director (ambiguous)
Shape-matching →L1 VPT 
(Altercentric interference)
Go/No-Go → L1 VPT 
(Altercentric interference)
Go/No-Go (picture) → L1 VPT 
(Altercentric interference)
SST → L1 VPT (Altercentric 
interference)
Shape-matching → L1 VPT 
(Egocentric interference)
Go/No-Go → L1 VPT (Egocentric 
interference)
Go/No-Go (picture) → L1 VPT 
(Egocentric interference)
SST → L1 VPT (Egocentric 
interference)
.20 (.08) .21**
Covariances Unstandardised Estimate (Standard Error) Standardised Estimate
Director (relational) ↔ Director 
(ambiguous) 3.47 (.55) .63***
L1 VPT (Egocentric interference) 
↔L1 VPT (Altercentric 
interference)
7.52 (2.96) .22*
Go/No-Go ↔ SST 2.29 (1.18) .16*
Go/No-Go ↔ Go/No-Go (picture) 1.38 (.55) .22*
Variances Estimate (Standard Error)
Shape-Matching 23.60 (2.81)***
Go/No-Go 4.48 (.53)***
Go/No-Go (picture) 9.22 (1.10)***
SST 45.20 (5.38)***
e1 (Director (relational)) 5.99 (.71)***
e2 (Director (ambiguous)) 5.10 (.61)***
e3 (L1 VPT (Egocentric 
interference))
31.40 (3.74)***
e4 (L1 VPT (Altercentric 
interference))
37.57 (4.47)***
Squared Multiple Correlations
Director (relational) .12
Director (ambiguous) .11
L1 VPT (Egocentric interference) .04
L1 VPT (Altercentric interference) .00
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
Model fit values are shown in Table 6. 
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Table 6. Model fit parameters
CMIN df p NFI CFI AIC RMSEA Low High Bollen-Stine Bootstrap p 
Model 1 20.32 10 <.05 .87 .92 72.32 .09 .03 .14 .06
Model 2 29.17 21 .11 .81 .94 59.17 .05 .00 .10 .18
Model 3 20.16 20 .45 .87 .99 52.16 .01 .00 .07 .52
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